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ABSTRACT
This dissertation combines the role of credit market distortions in monetary policy trans­
mission and the impact of government policy on the financial sector, which have to date 
been studied separately in the literature. The thesis argues simultaneous interaction be­
tween these two sectors can lead to an endogenous policy reversal attached to any govern­
ment stabilization effort. Policy reversal can be described as a situation where government 
policies of sound fiscal management or financial restructuring so adversely affect the bank­
ing sector (due to underlying inefficiencies) that it is subsequently forced to revive the 
sector with policies such as recapitalization of public sector banks, honoring contingent lia­
bilities or explicit bail-out packages that serve to undermine the initial stabilization efforts 
and adversely affect the government exchequer. The dissertation provides an overview of 
the Indian banking sector (Chapter 2) emphasizing the possibility of policy reversal and 
concludes financial sector reform in India is incomplete. The banking sector remains ineffi­
cient due to several factors viz. high reserves and liquidity requirements, a poor regulatory 
and supervisory framework and the presence of implicit government guarantees and high 
transaction costs.
The dissertation formally models and quantifies partial policy reversals subsequent to the 
introduction of stabilization programs particularly in developing countries, in a general 
equilibrium set up. The theoretical model predicts the offsetting effect attached to stabi­
lization policy can only be eliminated by adopting loose monetary policy thereby undermin­
ing any initial stabilization measures. Using data from India, it then provides empirical 
support for the model’s prediction. Subsequently the dissertation empirically tests two 
assumptions underlying endogenous policy reversals viz. government satisfies its intertem­
poral budget constraint and banks play a significant role in monetary policy transmission.
Satisfaction of the government’s intertemporal budget constraint is related to the broader 
question of debt sustainability. The dissertation argues the debate on debt sustainability 
should be examined in the light of recent advances on endogenous structural breaks in 
the cases of unit root analysis and cointegration, since revenue and expenditure series
are susceptible to structural breaks in response to sharp economic shocks. The empirical 
analysis discovers that structural breaks or regime shifts play a crucial role in time series 
analysis of revenue and expenditure series, in the case of India. The contributions of this 
analysis are in providing a basis for testing for debt sustainability even in the absence of 
data on debt; and a methodology for inducting unknown structural breaks in the analysis 
of the sustainability of public debt at both the unit root testing and cointegration stages. 
In the particular case of India, it is discovered that the debt is not unsustainable, in sharp 
contrast to the widely prevalent view in extant literature and policy discussions. However 
this result is supportive of an assumption made in the context of the general equilibrium 
model developed here.
The dissertation further empirically justifies the importance of the bank lending channel 
in India. The empirical analysis uses aggregate data to establish a long run relationship 
between the interest rate spread and bank credit (using cointegration). The analysis further 
reveals that bank credit does adjust significantly in the direction of equilibrium in the short 
run confirming the role of banks in transmitting monetary shocks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 O verview
This dissertation investigates the role of the banking sector in affecting the impact of 
stabilization policies and creating endogenous forces which could lead to partial policy 
reversal of stabilization measures. A policy reversal can be described as a situation where 
government policies of sound fiscal management or financial restructuring so adversely 
affect an inefficient banking sector, that the government is forced to revive the banking 
sector by using policies such as recapitalization of public sector banks, honoring contingent 
liabilities or explicit bail-out packages that undermine its initial efforts and adversely affect 
the government exchequer. Examples of potential policy reversals include stabilization 
policies in Russia and Brazil when these countries were suffering chronically high inflation 
pre-crisis. Due to high inflation banks had a huge markup on profits. As soon as inflation 
fell sharply, banks faced reduced profits or losses forcing the government to bail them out.
A more recent example is the Unit Trust of India (UTI) mutual funds crisis in 2002. The 
main objective of UTI (which had a monopoly in the funds market until 1985) was to invest 
retail savings in the capital market and pass the accrued benefits back to small investors. 
The crisis was caused by the poor regulatory and supervisory framework in India. This
1
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environment encouraged UTI to make imprudent investment decisions which resulted in 
large losses. As a result the UTI market share dropped from 77 per cent in 1999 to 46 per 
cent in 2002. Due to intense political sensitivity involved, after initial denials of bailout1, 
the government was forced to backtrack and approved a package of over Rs. 145 billion 
for UTI to meet the liabilities on its returns schemes.2
The outline of the present chapter is as follows: Section 2 surveys the literature highlighting 
the linkages between the banking sector crisis and stabilization policies. Section 3 outlines 
the structure of this dissertation and summarizes its contributions to the literature.
1.1.1 Stab ilization
The dissertation uses the word stabilization broadly in reference to the “orthodox stabi­
lization” (Bruno, 1993) which affects the real fundamentals and are a part of more broader 
“structural reforms” . As Bruno (1993, page 269) points out the objective of such stabiliza­
tion policy is to achieve internal and external balance in the following ways: For orthodox 
stabilization: “(a) Establish permanent budget balance (usually includes substantial cut in 
direct and indirect subsidies and increase in taxes), (b) Up-front devaluation (usually fol­
lowed by an initial exchange-rate peg...), (c) Establish or bolster central bank independence, 
(I) Obtain external stabilization fund (and/or debt rescheduling) and (e) Establish social 
sifety net, within constraint of (a) (to soften immediate distributional costs and facilitate 
political acceptance).”
The objective of structural reforms is to remove micro-distortions to enhance efficient
growth in following ways: “(a) External current-account liberalization (remove quotas and
Ixensing with or without pre-announced receding tariff schedule), (b) Fiscal reforms (of tax,
1In a press conference the finance minister Y. Sinha was quoted as saying, “We cannot go on spending 
government money for bailouts. A budgetary support is not a desirable option at the moment.”
2 UTI crisis has been discussed in detail in Appendix A.
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expenditure, and internal transfer systems), (c) Deregulation of domestic financial and cap­
ital markets and creation of new institutions for financial intermediation, (d) Deregulation 
a nd/or liberalization of labor markets (e) Privatization and de-monopolization of goods and 
services, and (f) Deregulation of the external capital account. ”
The government can use fiscal or monetary policies to achieve its objective of stabilization. 
There are various channels of transmission of stabilization policies (See Mishkin, 1995, for 
an excellent discussion on these). This dissertation focusses on the bank lending channel 
of transmission of stabilization policy. The bank lending channel is based on the view that 
banks play an important role as a financial institution for small firms or bank dependent 
borrowers. According to this channel real economic activity in the economy can be affected 
through the supply of loans in the financial sector and keeping interest rates broadly 
unchanged. Thus banks respond to a monetary contraction by decreasing the supply 
of loans thereby adversely affecting the aggregate output and inflation in the economy. 
The basic underlying assumption for the existence of a credit channel is imperfection in 
the capital markets and it is argued that this channel tends to weaken with financial 
innovation and liberalization of capital markets (Kashyap and Stein, 1994). The literature 
argues tha t as a result of the vastly expanding financial innovation of recent times, banks 
have a less important role to play in credit markets (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). While 
this argument may be true for the developed economies where financial liberalization is 
advanced, for developing countries with weak financial systems, banks continue to play a 
crucial role in credit markets.3
3 For a discussion on bank lending channel see Chapter 5.
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1.2 Banking Sector and Stabilization
The factors responsible for financial distress in an economy can be grouped under the 
following headings: unsustainable macroeconomic policies, weakness in financial structure, 
global financial shocks, exchange rate misalignments, and political instability (Kunt and 
Detragiache, 1998). In addition, fluctuations in the economy give rise to shifts in market 
sentiments that contribute to stress in the financial system. Macroeconomic instability 
has been an underlying factor in many financial crises (e.g. 1997 East Asian currency 
crisis); expansionary monetary and fiscal policies have spurred lending booms, excessive 
debt accumulation, and over investment in real assets, which have driven up equity and real 
estate prices to unsustainable levels. This has often lead to a speculative bubble (Corsetti 
et al., 1998b) (Kho and Stulz, 1999) (Burnside et al., 2001).
Eventually governments have to tighten policy to contain inflation and promote the adjust­
ment of external positions, and the inevitable correction of asset prices. Such stabilization 
policies lead to a slowdown in economic activity, debt servicing difficulties, declining col­
lateral values and net worth, and rising levels of non performing loans that threaten banks’ 
solvency (Corsetti et al., 1998a). Lending booms were the major cause of financial crises in 
Latin American countries (Ter-Minnassian and Schwartz, 1997). Macroeconomic instabil­
ity has been an important factor in most banking crises experienced by industrial countries 
in the post war period (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998).
A banking crises refers to a situation where actual or potential bank runs or failures induce 
banks to suspend the internal convertibility of their liabilities or compel the government 
to intervene to prevent this by extending assistance on a large scale (IMF, 1998). Bank­
ing crises can lead to a “credit crunch” (Bernanke and Lown, 1991) causing a reduction 
in the flow of credit to households and firms thereby adversely affecting investment and 
consumption. Stress in financial sector can also reduce confidence in the financial insti-
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tutional structure leading to reduced domestic savings and large capital outflows (Cerra 
and Saxena, 2002) (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2000). Efforts to bail out may involve use of 
expansionary monetary policy (reflected by, say, recapitalization measures used to rescue 
banks (Bhattacharya and Patel, 2003)) and public funds which may have an adverse effect 
on the government budget. Protection of the banking sector allows inefficient banks to 
stay in business (at the cost of healthy banks) and reduces incentive for adequate risk 
management (see Shirai, 2002, for discussion on India).
But expansionary monetary policy to prevent banking sector losses can increase inflation 
and also trigger a speculative attack against the currency in “pegged” exchange rate regimes 
specific to most developing countries (Rebelo, 1994) (Chang and Velasco, 2000). Banks 
become insolvent when the value of their liabilities (deposits) exceed the value of their 
assets (bank credit). Banks in the financial sector of many developing countries face credit 
risk (Kunt and Detragiache, 1998) and suffer from a high incidence of Non-Performing 
Assets (NPAs) i.e. those loans on which borrowers default (Bhattacharya and Patel, 2003).* 4 
The literature argues credit risk can be reduced by screening loan applicants (Sinn, 2001) 
and, diversifying the loan portfolio by lending to borrowers who are subject to different 
risk factors (Elyasiani et al., 1995), or asking for collateral.
However, in developing countries it is very difficult to eliminate credit risk. There is an 
incentive for banks in these countries to invest in somewhat “riskier” projects as returns are 
higher. Banks behave in this way because of a weak regulatory and supervisory framework 
and the presence of implicit government guarantees to bail them out of a crisis (Polackova, 
1999). Government policy of concessional and directed lending to “priority sectors” also 
contributes to high NPAs (Ketkar, 1993). The banks also suffer from the high transaction
costs of making loans.5 Though governments encourage group lending to reduce transac­
t o r  example, in 1992-93, NPA’s amounted for 24 per cent of total assets of public sector banks in
India.
5The opportunity cost of high transaction costs is put at 2 to 3 per cent of GDP by the Reserve Bank
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tions costs, they remain significantly high (Puhazhendhi, 1995). Thus “non-policy” shocks 
such as terms of trade deterioration or a decline in asset (equity or real estate) prices 
which adversely affect bank borrowers (firms and households) can lead to a banking crisis 
as credit risk diversification is minimal in underdeveloped economies.
However some “policy shocks” , such as an increase in short term interest rates caused by 
adoption of restrictive monetary policy, can adversely affect banks’ balance sheets even if 
they do not have significant NPAs (Kashyap and Stein, 1994). An increase in interest rates 
may cause banks’ returns from lending operations to fall short of the rate that must be paid 
on liabilities. For example, a rise in savings deposit rates will force banks to pass on the 
increase to depositors. However, banks’ returns on assets will not change as they mostly 
consist of long term loans on fixed interest rates which cannot adjust quickly in the short 
run. Banks cannot pass on the higher interest rates to borrowers because of the policy of 
directed and concessional lending in most developing countries. Even if banks are allowed 
to increase lending rates there is a risk of a rise in the share of NPAs. Small borrowers will 
default on loans rather than pay higher interest rates. Thus a policy-based stabilization 
process may lead to reduced profits or losses in the banking sector. In countries like India 
where government is the major banks’ shareholder* 6 the government has to rescue the banks. 
This action offsets the government’s initial stabilization efforts.
Another example of policy shock that leads to banking distress is successful inflation sta­
bilization policy in economies suffering from chronically high inflation. An economy with 
high inflation is characterized by an overblown financial sector and banks’ profit from the 
float on payments. Therefore a drastic reduction in inflation as a result of stabilization 
policies results in one of the main sources of banks’ revenue disappearing. Recent banking
sector difficulties in Russia and Brazil are explained in this way.
of India (RBI) (RBI, 2003a).
6In 2003 the public sector banks owned by the government of India accounted for about 80 per cent of 
deposits, assets and credit in the economy (CII, 2004).
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Liberalizing an economy, say, by an easing of capital controls combined with a simultaneous 
restrictive monetary policy of raising domestic rates to curb inflation, may lead to a period 
of large inflows of short term capital and expansion of domestic credit. When investors 
lose confidence or when world interest rate rises relative to domestic rates there is a sudden 
outflow of short term capital making the banking sector illiquid. The crises in East Asian 
countries in the late 1990’s and Latin American countries in the early 1990’s are attributed 
to this.
Bank profitability can also be threatened when a rate of return mismatch occurs as a 
result of banks’ borrowings in foreign currency and lending in domestic currency (Burnside 
et al., 2001). In this case, an unexpected depreciation of the domestic currency would 
threaten bank profitability. The banks in this case can also choose to issue domestic 
loans denominated in foreign currency in order to hedge but an unexpected devaluation 
will then result in an increase in NPAs thereby affecting the profitability of the loans. 
Foreign currency loans were a source of banking problems in Chile in 1981, Mexico in 1995 
(Goldberg et al., 2000), the Nordic countries in the early 1990’s and in Turkey in 1994.
The crux of the argument here is that the economic implications of a banking crisis can 
be significant in an economy with an underdeveloped financial sector. A banking crisis 
restricts the capacity of banks to make domestic loans. Thus bank-dependent borrowers, 
such as small business, may find it more costly to obtain credit. This may be inefficient and 
inequitable for an economy where small businesses play an important role in developing 
product and process innovations (Bernanke and Lown, 1991). A “credit crunch” could also 
lead to a decline in economic activity, affecting both aggregate demand and supply
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) do a modified IS  — LM analysis under the additional as­
sumption that bank loans are imperfect substitutes for other assets (bond and money).7
7This assumption implies the financial sector is not competitive enough to make the alternative sources 
of finance easily accessible to small borrowers.
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They conclude an exogenous decline in bank lending is a negative I S  shock to the economy. 
This is because at a given interest rate, the net return to investment for a bank depen­
dent borrower depends on the marginal product of investment as well as the the cost of 
financial intermediation. An exogenous decrease in banks’ lending capacity will force the 
bank dependent borrower to either cancel the decision to borrow or opt for some costlier 
form of credit. In both cases the net return to investment falls at a given interest rate and 
hence the I S  curve shifts down. Ceteris Paribus, the downward I S  shift is contractionary. 
Hence there are two areas where reduction in bank lending can have a serious impact: a 
direct effect on bank-dependent borrowers and indirect effects on the economy.
Thus a banking crisis may be triggered by policy shocks arising from, for example, monetary 
targeting (achieved by restrictive monetary policy) which can create a “liquidity crunch” 
aid is recessionary. The onus then is on the financial sector to bail out the economy from 
recession through the credit channel. In most developing countries where the financial 
sector is underdeveloped, banks cannot tackle a credit crunch so that the onus is again 
on the government exchequer to bail out the economy. This may lead to what is called a 
partial policy reversal by government which offsets its initial efforts of stabilization. The 
underlying reason behind policy reversals is inefficiency in the financial sector. Chapter 2 
o: this dissertation highlights the main inefficiencies in the Indian banking sector which can 
contribute to policy reversals by the government. Chapter 3 formally models the possibility 
of policy reversal in a general equilibrium setup.
One of the crucial assumptions of a policy reversal mechanism is that government is capable 
of honoring its contingent liabilities and rescuing the financial sector. The immediate effect 
of a policy reversal will be an increase in the government’s fiscal deficit which will have to 
he financed by external or internal debt. Thus it is implicitly assumed that government 
sitisfies its intertemporal budget constraint. Chapter 4 tests for the solvency of central
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and state government deficits for India.
Another imperative underlying assumption for policy reversal is that banks play a signifi­
cant role in financial propagation mechanism or in other words the bank lending channel 
is an important channel of monetary transmission in the economy. It is argued in the liter­
ature (Kashyap and Stein, 1993) (Kashyap and Stein, 1994) (Huang, 2003) that financial 
sector reforms tend to reduce the effectiveness of the bank lending channel as the share 
of alternative sources of finance from bonds or equity markets increases in the economy. 
Chapter 5 tests for this in the Indian case.
1.3 Outline of the D issertation
This dissertation is divided into six chapters. Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of the 
evolution of the banking sector in India, emphasizing those inefficiencies wdiich can lead to 
policy reversal.
Chapter 3 proposes a theoretical framework and formally models the possibility of policy 
reversals in the context of an economy with the broad characteristics discussed in chapter 
2. The extant literature focusses either on the “bad market” or “bad policy” while dis­
cussing the effectiveness of the credit channel of monetary transmission. This dissertation 
integrates both credit market distortions and the presence of government policies (such as 
providing implicit guarantees to the financial sector), contributing to inefficiencies of the 
financial sector, in a single framework. The theoretical model further reveals that simul­
taneous interaction between these two sectors can lead to an endogenous partial offsetting 
effect attached to any stabilization effort by government. There are four groups of compet­
itive agents: banks, households, firms and government. Banks are assumed to be perfectly 
CDmpetitive, borrowing from domestic depositors and foreign creditors. The banks borrow
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in dollars from abroad and lend in local currency thereby exposing themselves to exchange 
rate risk. Three assumptions are introduced in the model which typically characterize 
developing economies and are key sources of inefficiency in the banking sector. These 
are: (i) Banks incur transaction costs while generating credit, (ii) Government issues con­
tingent liabilities as a guarantee to foreign creditors in case the bank defaults on foreign 
borrowings and (iii) Imperfect capital mobility. Banks determine their optimal strategy 
given the borrowing rate they face and the guarantees against default provided by govern­
ment. Households derive utility from consumption and leisure, provide labor, own firms 
and spend against their deposits held in the banks and face a cash-in-advance constraint 
when making purchases. Firms produce the only output in the economy by a single factor 
of production (labor) using constant returns to scale technology. The government satisfies 
its intertemporal budget constraint. The empirical analysis tests the transmission mech­
anism of the model using Indian data. A reduced form Vector Auto Regression (VAR) 
approach and generalized impulse response functions are used to investigate the impact of 
an exogenous shock in the economy. The chapter demonstrates the empirical evidence is 
consistent with the prediction of the theoretical model.
This dissertation then asks the question: Is th e  govern m en t ab le  to  honor its  guar­
antees to  th e  financial sec to r  or, in o th er w ords, does th e  govern m en t sa tisfy  
its in te r tem p o ra l b u dget con stra in t in th e  long run?  This question is answered 
empirically in chapter 4 for the case of India. The chapter provides a basis for testing 
for debt sustainability even in the absence of data on debt, by using information on rev­
enue and expenditure. The chapter also argues that since revenue and expenditure of any 
gwernment are susceptible to sharp shocks (e.g. war, oil price shocks or shocks arising 
fiom government’s own policy like financial restructuring), debate on debt sustainability 
should be examined in light of recent advances on endogenous structural breaks in the 
cises of unit root analysis and cointegration. Hence the chapter provides a methodology
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for inducting unknown structural breaks in the analysis of the sustainability of pubic debt 
a t both the unit root testing and the cointegration testing stages. Chapter 4 proposes a 
methodology to test for debt sustainability which can be used to determine the solvency of 
government intertemporal budget constraint. If public expenditure and public revenue are 
7(0) public debt is sustainable but if they are 7(1) and not cointegrated public debt is said 
to be unsustainable. Extant work indicates India’s public debt is unsustainable. However, 
this does not consider the fiscal deficit of the central and state governments combined, nor 
does it permit the possibility of endogenous structural breaks. Chapter 4 rectifies both 
shortcomings and thus presents a more complete analysis of the sustainability of fiscal 
deficit in India and shows that while the burden of the deficit is onerous, public debt is 
sustainable.
One of the crucial assumptions of the theoretical model discussed in chapter 3 is that banks 
play a significant role in the transmission of monetary policy. This issue is addressed in 
chapter 5. The effectiveness of the bank lending channel tends to diminish with financial 
liberalization (Kashyap and Stein, 1994). The Indian economy has undergone over a decade 
of financial sector liberalization. In the light of this, chapter 5 asks the following question: 
H as financial libera liza tion  in recen t years affected  th e  m o n e ta ry  transm ission  
m ech anism  b y  a lter in g  th e  channels through which i t  op era tes?  The chapter 
tests the importance of the bank lending channel in the monetary transmission mechanism 
using the Indian data. Cointegration technique allowing for regime change is applied in 
the empirical analysis and a cointegrating relationship is tested between the interest rate 
spread (difference between the lending rate and banks return on investment) and bank 
credit thus indicating the long-run response of bank credit to changes in this spread. The 
analysis discovers a structurally stable long run relationship for bank credit with significant 
coefficients on the interest rate spread. The estimation of short run dynamics reveals that 
once such regime changes are allowed for, bank loans adjust significantly in the direction
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of equilibrium after the system is subjected to an exogenous shock. Hence the chapter 
concludes banks play a critical role in the transmission mechanism and the results of 
this chapter support an important underlying assumption of the model (i.e. banks play 
an important role in the credit transmission mechanism) developed in chapter 3, hence 
further validating the robustness of the theoretical model. Chapter 6 concludes.
Chapter 2
Banking Sector in India: An Overview
2.1 In troduction
In the first decade following India’s independence in 1947, the banking sector was char­
acterized by low reserve requirements and no control on interest rates (Demetriades and 
Luintel, 1996). Acting pursuant to its policy of directed and concessional lending to prior­
ity sectors (agriculture, exports, small scale industry) the government assumed control of 
the financial sector in the 1960’s by nationalizing the major banks. Liquidity requirements 
were raised and interest rates on lending and deposits controlled and these became a major 
source of inefficiencies in the banking sector, through out the 1970’s and 1980’s. Conces­
sional lending to priority sectors with weak regulatory and supervision framework led to a 
high incidence of NPAs in the banking sector. In 1992-93 NPAs amounted to 24 per cent of 
the total assets of public sector banks. The government began a gradual process of finan­
cial sector reforms in the mid 1980’s. Even though the pace of reform increased following 
the 1991 financial crisis, they remain incomplete. Demetriades and Luintel (1996) examine 
the effect of various types of banking controls on financial deepening in India and conclude 
these controls (with the exception of the lending rate ceiling) are having a negative impact 
on financial deepening and thus adversely affecting economic growth.
13
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The Indian economy has experienced more than a decade of economic reform following 
the 1991 financial crisis. The present chapter focusses on a critical analysis of the reforms 
process with emphasis on the banking sector, to highlight those inefficiencies which can 
contribute to “policy reversal” by the government. Policy reversal can be described as a 
situation in which government policies of sound fiscal management or financial restruc­
turing adversely affect the banking sector (due to underlying inefficiencies) so that the 
government is forced to revive the banking sector by using policies such as recapitalization 
of public sector banks, honoring contingent liabilities or explicit bail-out packages that 
serve to undermine its initial efforts and adversely affect the government exchequer. This 
chapter provides a brief overview of the evolution of the banking sector in India. Partic­
ular emphasis is placed on the possibility of policy reversal. The outline of the chapter is 
as follows: Section 1 describes the structure of the banking sector in India and its main 
characteristics in the pre-1991 period. Section 2 outlines the causes and impact of the 
1991 financial crisis focussing on the changes in exchange rate regime. Section 3 critically 
analyzes the banking sector reforms after 1991 and summarizes current inefficiencies in the 
banking sector emphasizing high transaction costs and presence of the contingent liabili­
ties. Section 4 discusses the relevance of policy reversals in India and cites some examples. 
Section 5 concludes.
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2.2 Banking Sector in India
Banks in India are classified under the broad categories of scheduled and non-scheduled 
(Figure 2.1). Scheduled banks consists of Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs) and sched­
uled cooperative banks. Non Scheduled Banks comprise banks that are not included in 
the Second Schedule of the Banking Regulation Act of 1965 and thus do not satisfy the 
following conditions: a) have paid-up capital and reserve of not less than Rs. 500000 and b) 
Satisfy the RBI that its affairs are not conducted in a manner detrimental to the interests 
of depositors.
Scheduled commercial banks are further split into Public Sector Banks (PSBs), private 
seaoi banks, foreign banks and Regional Rural Banks (RRBs).
Publb sector banks consists of nationalized banks and State Bank of India (SBI) group 
of banks. In 1969 the Indian government nationalized existing large private sector banks 
under its policy of assisting India’s planned development strategy by mobilizing financial 
resources to strategically important sectors. Fourteen banks were nationalized in 1969 and 
six in 1980. The Punjab National Bank was merged with the New Bank of India in 1993 
thereby reducing the total count of national banks to nineteen. The SBI group comprises 
the S3I and its seven independently capitalized subsidiaries. The government of India is 
the major share holder in these banks. Prior to 1991, PSBs accounted for about 90% of 
all deposits assets and credit in the economy.
Private sector banks are classified as old and new private sector banks. There are 23 old 
private sector banks. 8 private sector banks opened for business after 1991 and are classified 
as nev private sector banks. Currently there are 42 foreign banks in India, although their 
share in the holdings of banking sector assets remains negligible due to strict regulatory 
and mtry requirements.
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RRBs operate exclusively in rural areas to provide credit to small farmers and entrepreneurs. 
There are currently 196 RRBs accounting for 4 per cent of the total assets of scheduled 
commercial banks.
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Figure 2.1: Banking Structure in India
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India also has specialized financial institutions under the following categories: big indus­
try, investment and credit guarantee, exim trade, capital market, agriculture and housing 
development. Their geographic reach is classified as all India, state-level and other in­
stitutions. All-India financial institutions include (a) development banks (i.e., Industrial 
Development Bank of India, Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India, Small 
Industrial Development Bank, Industrial Investment Bank of India, and Industrial Finance 
Corporation of India); (b) specialized financial institutions (such as, Export Import Bank 
of India, Technology Development and Information Company of India); (c) investment in­
stitutions (i.e., UTI, Life Insurance Corporation of India, General Insurance Corporation 
and subsidiaries); and (d) refinance institutions (i.e., National Bank for Agriculture and 
Rural Development (NABARD) and National Housing Bank). The role of these financial 
institutions is to promote economic development in various sectors of the economy. State 
level institutions include state financial corporations and state industrial development cor­
porations. Other institutions consist of the Export Credit and Guarantee Corporation of 
India and Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation. (Shirai, 2002).
2.2.1 Pre-reform  Period
The banking system in India prior to 1991 was highly regulated and inefficient. The most 
significant of these distortions were:
• The existence of high levels of Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) and Statuary Liquidity 
Ratio (SLR): CRR is a requirement on banks to hold a certain amount of deposits in 
the form of deposits to RBI. It is calculated as a percentage of reserve liabilities which 
are defined as a difference between all liabilities exempted from the SLR requirement 
and net time and demand deposits. The CRR rose from around 15 per cent in 1960- 
70 to its upper legal limit of 15 per cent in 1991. The high value of CRR led to low
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profitability for banks and higher spreads. The RBI uses CRR as a tool for monetary 
intervention in the economy; e.g. the RBI increased CRR in August 1993 in order to 
sterilize capital inflows (Shirai, 2002). SLR is a liquidity requirement1 for banks to 
hold a certain amount of deposits in the form of government and eligible securities. 
The upper legal limit of SLR is 40 per cent. SLR increased from 25 per cent in 1970 
to 38.5 per cent in 1991. Hence for some time periods overall reserve requirements 
exceeded 50 per cent.
• Prior to 1991, Indian interest rates were administered by government. These included 
lending and deposits rates including rates on saving deposits. The administration 
of rates was politically motivated and adversely affected bank balance sheets. Joshi 
and Little (1996) report the average return on assets in the second half of the 1980’s 
was just 0.15 per cent.
• Directed and Concessional Lending: The government pursued a policy of allocation 
of financial resources to the so-called “priority sectors” . These included agriculture, 
small scale industries, small business and self-employed persons. Thus policy set 
quantitative loan targets2 on banks and was a major reason behind the NPAs of 
public sector banks. At the beginning of 1992-93 NPAs amounted to 24 per cent of 
total credit.3
• Lack of competition in the banking sector: The role of foreign and private sector 
banks remained negligible due to restricted entry regulations and strict branch li-
1 “Under section 24 (b) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, every bank is required to maintain at the 
close of business every day, a minimum proportion of their Net Demand and Time Liabilities as liquid 
assets in the form of cash, gold and un-encumbered approved securities. The ratio of liquid assets to 
demand and time liabilities is known as Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR). Present SLR is 25 per cent. The 
RBI is empowered to increase the SLR up to 40 per cent” (RBI Glossary).
2In 1974, banks were required to direct 33 per cent of their net bank credit at concessional fixed interest 
rates to priority sectors. This was raised gradually to 40 per cent in 1980.
3NPAs have been defined as those loans for which interest has remained unpaid for four quarters in 
1992-93.
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censing policies.
These government policies were the main cause of deteriorating bank performances 
and diminished banks’ incentive to operate efficiently. There was lack of a proper 
regulation and supervision mechanism, which allowed banks to take high risks. This 
situation was worsened by the presence of implicit government guarantees i.e. the 
existence of contingent liabilities in the system.
The reform process in the banking sector started in the second half of the 1980’s but was 
only seriously implemented after the 1991 financial crisis. Table 2.1 summarizes salient 
aspects of the progress of the commercial banking sector in India.
Table 2.1: Progress of Commercial Banking in India
Jun-69 Dec-80 Mar-91 Mar-95 Mar-99
No. of SCBs 73.0 154.0 272.0 281.0 297.0
Per capita Deposit (Rs.) 88.0 738.0 2368.0 4242.0 8247.0
Per capita Credit (Rs.) 68.0 457.0 1434.0 2320.0 4705.0
Share of Priority Sector advances 
in Total Non-food credit of SCBs(%) 15.0 40.3 39.2 35.8 35.9
Deposits (% of National Income) 15.5 36.0 48.1 46.4 48.7
Total Assets (Rs. Billion) 68.4 710.8 3275.2 5215.4 11516.2
Source: RBI (2003b)
The evolution of the financial crisis of 1991 and its impact on the Indian economy is now 
briefly outlined.4
4For a detailed analysis on financial crisis see Joshi and Little (1996), Cerra and Saxena (2002), Kapila 
and Kapila (1996) and Rangrajan (1991) among others.
CHAPTER 2. BANKING SECTOR IN INDIA: A N  OVERVIEW 21
2.3 Financial Crisis in India
Prior to 1991 some important financial characteristics of the Indian economy can be sum­
marized as follows:
• Restrictive Capital Controls: Direct Investment was restricted. Capital inflows mainly 
consisted of foreign aid, commercial borrowings and Non-Resident Indian (NRI) de­
posits. Indian companies were not allowed to hold foreign equities. The foreign 
portfolio investment was mainly directed toward a small number of public sector 
bond issues.
• High fiscal deficits: Fiscal deficits were consistently high (combined gross fiscal deficit 
of state and central government rose by 20 and 24 per cent respectively in 1990 
and 1991) and mainly financed by borrowings and financial repression rather than 
monetization. As a result the inflation rate did not reach extremely high levels and 
was at a par with India’s trading partners.
• Pegged Exchange Rate: The exchange rate was officially pegged to a basket of curren­
cies. However the trade-weighted nominal exchange rate depreciated steadily relative 
to the US$ in the latter half of the 1980’s leading to small frequent devaluations. The 
rate of nominal depreciation was faster than the relative inflation differential leading 
to falls in the real exchange rate.
• Trade: The government strategy was highly interventionist since independence and 
consisted of import substitution, complex industrial licensing requirements and public 
ownership of heavy industry. In the second half of the 1980’s, the emphasis shifted 
from import substitution to export-led growth. The government began a process of 
gradual liberalization of trade, investment, and financial markets. Export growth was 
rapid due to real depreciation of the rupee. However the value of imports increased
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at a faster rate (mainly in the petroleum sector) because of the easing of quantitative 
restrictions.
2.3.1 1991 Financial Crisis
• Due to a widening gap between exports and imports and downturn of capital flows 
the current account deficit grew steadily and was financed by external borrowings and 
remittances of NRIs making the economy extremely vulnerable to external shocks. 
External debt was $69 billion in 1990-91 compared with $35 billion in 1984-85.
• Shocks: The first external shock was the sharp increase in world oil prices due to the 
Gulf War increasing the value of petroleum imports from $2 billion to $5.7 billion 
which was quite high compared to 5 per cent increase in non-oil imports. Exports 
were also adversely affected due to the impact of the Gulf war on India’s trading 
panners. For example, growth of India’s single largest trading partner, the US, fell 
from 3.9 per cent in 1989 to -1 per cent in 1991. This led to a sharp deterioration in 
the trade account. The Gulf crisis also resulted in a decline in non resident workers’ 
remittances to India.
Apart from these external factors, political uncertainty in India in 1990 and 1991 
led to a fall in investor confidence further widening current account imbalances and 
causing a loss in reserves. India’s credit rating was downgraded by credit rating 
agencies leading to difficulties in commercial bank financing. The outflows from the 
economy were quick and as the forex reserves declined, the economy was on the brink 
of cefault by January 1991. One of the major policy shifts in response to the financial 
crias was a change in exchange rate management. The next section briefly outlines 
excrange rate policy changes from 1970 to the present.
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2.3.2 Exchange rate regim e in India
W ith the collapse of the Bretton Woods arrangement in 1973 most developed economies 
switched from a fixed exchange rate to a flexible exchange rate regime. Under a fixed ex­
change rate regime the central bank announces the buying and selling rates of its currency 
in terms of a foreign currency and commits to trade in unlimited amounts at that rate. 
Normally the exchange rate is allowed to vary within a narrow band. One major drawback 
of a fixed exchange rate regime in economies with perfect capital mobility is that monetary 
stabilization policy becomes ineffective (Obstfeld, 1995). For example if a government at­
tempts to increase money supply by open market purchase of domestic bonds, households 
will find themselves holding more money than they desire. Since interest rate parity con­
dition holds, household will sell their excess money holdings to the central bank for foreign 
currency at the fixed exchange rate and invest abroad to buy the desired amount of bonds. 
Such a mechanism will keep interest rates unchanged and leave the government with more 
bonds on the cost of forex reserves. One option for government will then be to refuse to 
buy the excess money supply and allow the currency to depreciate.
In spite of its drawbacks a fixed exchange rate regime is preferred in some developing 
economies especially those with limited capital mobility. This is due to the following 
perceptions: a) A fixed exchange rate regime removes exchange rate uncertainty thereby 
retaining investor confidence and macroeconomic stability; b) The export import industry 
can be protected from huge swings in exchange rates by keeping it stable and c) If the 
currency is pegged to a low inflation currency it helps keep domestic inflation low. For ex­
ample, a government running a very high deficit will be reluctant to adopt an expansionary 
monetary policy because of its ineffectiveness in a fixed rate regime.
Macroeconomic stability is a priority for any economy and all governments (irrespective 
of exchange rate regime) tend to intervene in the forex markets in order to influence the
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exchange rate. The government can take direct or indirect measures to counter exchange 
rate movements. Direct measures involve trading in the forex market. The government 
uses its foreign exchange reserves to affect demand and supply in the forek market. For 
example, if domestic currency is depreciating the government will buy excess money supply 
by selling forex reserves to stabilize supply demand imbalances.
The government can further offset this contractionary effect in domestic money supply 
by a simultaneous and equal purchase of domestic currency bonds. Such intervention is 
called “sterilized intervention” and is preferred by most governments. Such direct measures 
of intervention are complemented by some indirect measures like trade and interest rate 
restrictions to affect the demand and supply of foreign currency. For example, variable 
interest rates will affect the capacity of importers. One example is an interest rate surcharge 
on import finance: In order to curb imports and retain forex reserves, the RBI increased 
the interest rate surcharge on import finance from 15 per cent to 25 per cent in January 
1996.
Prior to 1991, the exchange rate regime in India, was pegged to a currency basket. Hence 
India had a fixed rate regime. Figure 2.2 plots the exchange rate and its annual change, for 
rupee from 1970 to 1990. A positive change indicates depreciation and a negative change 
indicates appreciation of the currency.
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Figure 2.2: Pre- reform Exchange Rate Variability
The plots show the nominal exchange rate remained almost stable during the two decades 
of the 1970’s and 1980’s. The rate of change moved in a band of ±6percent in the 1970’s 
except for 1979 when the rupee depreciated by 10 per cent due to the oil price shock.
During the 1991 financial crisis, faced with very low forex reserves the government floated 
the rupee, though the transition was gradual. Between 1991-93 there was a dual exchange 
rate regime and the rupee was subsequently floated in early 1993. International experience 
has shown exchange rate variability increases with a change to a more flexible rate regime.
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This has not been the case for India even after a decade of a floating rate regime as evident 
from the figure 2.3 which plots the real effective exchange rate for the rupee from 1993-2002.
Real Effective Exchange Rate(Mar 1993- Jul 2003)
Months
REER (Mar 93- Jul 2003)
Currency Depreciationfl993-2002) --------
1997
Years
Depreciation (1993-2003)
Source: RBI (2003c)
Figure 2.3: Post-reform Exchange Rate Variability
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This is essentially because a stable exchange rate remains an important objective of gov­
ernment exchange rate policy. Saggar (1999) notes the RBI’s intervention (measured by 
changes in foreign reserves) has in fact increased in the post 1993 period. The central bank 
has used both direct and indirect methods of market intervention.5
The main objective of government policy is to keep the exchange rate aligned with the 
fundamentals of the economy like inflation. Thus the exchange rate depreciated by 1.5 
per cent in September 1997 and the speed of depreciation was moderated by intervention 
sales by the RBI. In the central banks’ own words “...the conduct of exchange rate policy 
was guided by the need to maintain a delicate balance between the considerations of exter­
nal competitiveness and price stability” (RBI, 1997, page 1-9). This is also confirmed by 
analyzing the standard deviation of the rate of change in exchange rates, a measure of 
variability of the exchange rate. The standard deviation was 4.7 from 1970-80, 4.6 from 
1980-90 and 4.7 from 1993-2003. This evidence clearly indicates that although the rupee 
has been floated, the government plays an important role in influencing demand and supply 
of forex reserves and thereby the exchange rate.
2.4  P o s t-1991 B anking R eform s
Financial sector reform was launched in 1991, based on the recommendation of the Nar-
simhan Committee (1991) that was set up by the government. The 1991 financial reforms
were based on five fundamentals: Strengthening prudential norms and market discipline,
appropriate adoption of international benchmarks, management of organizational change
and consolidation, technological upgrading and human resource development. Figure 2.4
compares major macroeconomic variables in the pre-reform and post-reform period.
5For example (Kohli, 2001) reports the dates of indirect intervention done by RBI as October 1995, 
January and July 1996, November 1997 and January, June and August 1998.
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The banking sector reforms specifically included the following measures:
The RBI reduced the CRR from 15 per cent in 1991 to 5.75 per cent in November 2001. 
The cash reserve ratio was further reduced to 4.5 per cent in May 2004, although it remains 
higher than its statuary minimum level of 3 per cent. The SLR has been reduced from 38.5 
per cent in 1991 to 25 per cent in 2004. The general perception is that if the government 
reduces SLR the reduced demand for government bonds will lead to a rise in interest 
rates the government has to pay bond holders. This may adversely affect the fiscal deficit. 
However, banks have continued to invest around 40 per cent of their deposits in government 
securities in spite of the reduction in SLR. This is essentially because government bonds 
are considered to be a risk-free investment for banks.
Interest rates were deregulated in 1992 leading to complete liberalization of all term deposit 
and lending rates, except for savings deposit rates which remain controlled. The RBI has 
also begun using the bank rate (the rate at which RBI lends to commercial banks by 
rediscounting bills or eligible paper) as a reference rate for influencing the direction of 
interest rates in the economy (Bhide et al., 2001). The flexibility to set lending rates led 
the banks to use this measure to offset the cost involved in concessional lending to priority 
sectors.
During the reform period the ceiling of 40 per cent on domestic banks and 33 per cent 
on foreign banks for priority sector lending remained but banks were allowed to set the 
lending rates and more profitable sectors like the software industry and venture capital 
were included in the definition of priority sectors.
The government relaxed the norms for entry in the banking sector in order to increase 
competitiveness. For example the ceiling of voting rights of an individual shareholder was 
increased from 1 to 10 per cent in 1994. The relaxed guidelines led to the entry of 8 private 
sector banks and 26 new foreign banks in the Indian banking sector.
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In response to the Narsimhan Committee recommendations, the government gradually- 
started to privatize PSBs. These banks were accumulating large amounts of NPAs due 
to the pre-reform regulated regime. They made an aggregate loss of Rs. 35 billion and 
almost half of the public sector banks had negative net worth. Realizing the importance 
of recapitalization, the government spent in the range of 0.02 to 0.7 per cent of GDP each 
year to wipe off accumulated NPAs (Table 2.2).
Table 2.2: Cost of Banks’ Rescue (Rs. Billion)
1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 2001-2002
Capital Infusion 
Cumulative Infusion
57.0
97.0*
52.9
149.9
8.5
158.4
15.1
173.5
27.0
200.5
4.0
204.5
18.0
222.5
*: Includes Rs. 40 billion injected prior to 1993 
Source: Bhattacharya and Patel (2003)
This helped the banks clean up their balance sheets and make public issues of equity. As 
Table 2.3 shows, the central government still continues to hold a large share of holdings in 
major state-owned banks.6
6 The 1998 committee on banking sector reforms recommended the minimum shareholding by the gov­
ernment or RBI equity in nationalized bank should be brought down to 33 per cent.
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Table 2.3: Comparison of central government holdings by major Indian Banks after Public 
Issue
Bank name Date of Public Issue Government Percentage holding 
after public issue (%) as of 2001
State Bank of India December 1993 66.34
Sate Bank of Bikaner November 1997 75.00
State Bank of Baroda December 1996 66.88
State Bank of Travancore January 1998 76.00
Bank of India February 1997 77.00
Corporation Bank October 1997 66.33
Oriental Bank October 1994 66.48
Dena Bank December 1996 71.00
Source: Saez (2001)
Adoption of regulatory and supervision norms: Strengthening of the regulatory and su­
pervisory framework of the banking sector remains a key element of financial sector re­
form. The policy focus is on streamlining banking operations, upgrading risk management 
systems and enhancing the level of bank compliance with accounting standards and op­
erationalizing consolidated accounting practices (RBI, 2003c). However, progress in this 
direction has been gradual. The RBI notes: “ Within the process of convergence with best 
practices, finetuning is undertaken keeping in view the country specific circumstances 
(RBI, 2003d). For example, NPAs have been defined as loans in which interest has re­
mained unpaid for four quarters in 1992-93. This period was shortened to three quarters 
in 1993-94 and two quarters in 1994-95. The central bank now plans to further shorten the 
period (in March 2004) to match the international norm of one quarter. Thus NPAs were 
unierestimated by Indian accounting standards. The main reason behind such a policy 
was the political lobbying of borrowers. A summary of some aspects of the regulatory 
framework used by the RBI is given in Table 2.4.
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Table 2.4: Regulatory framework of Banking Sector in India
Variable 1992-93 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03
Capital to Risk-weighted Assets Ratio (%)
Domestic banks with international business 4 9 9 9
Foreign banks 8 9 9 9
Non-performing assets
(period overdue)
Sub-standard assets 4 Q 2 Q 180 days 180 days*
Doubtful Assets
period for which remained substandard 24 M 18 M 18 M 18 M®
Provisioning requirements (%)
Standard Assets - 0.25 0.25 0.25
Sub-standard assets 10 10 10 10
Doubtful Assets (unsecured portion) 100 100 100 100
Loss assets 100 100 100 100
Source: RBI (2003a)
M: Month ; Q: Quarter
*: 90 days after March 31, 2004
The financial sector reform process in India can be described as a graduated approach in 
the direction of liberalization. Figure 2.5 plots major banking indicators for the pre-reform 
and post-reform period.
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Figure 2.5: Trends in Major Banking Variables (1970-99)
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There are still some weaknesses in the financial sector which contribute to its inefficiencies. 
Though reduced from 40 per cent to 25 per cent, the SLR has remained at high levels. 
Moreover, bank investment in government bonds and securities is still around 40 per cent 
of their assets (Bhattacharya and Patel, 2003). This is because interest rates paid by 
the government are more market based due to the auction mechanism of its securities 
such as Treasury Bills; and also because banks prefer to invest in government securities 
as they are relatively risk free and more liquid. Banks are reluctant to take risks in 
alternative markets because of stricter prudential norms and accounting standards. The 
high investment in government securities is convenient for government which is running 
high fiscal deficits. However, when economic growth accelerates, high SLR can adversely 
affect the credit formation role of banks. Banks will be reluctant to lay off their securities 
in order to satisfy increased demand for credit. The CRR also remains higher than its 
statuary minimum of 3 per cent.
The deregulation in interest rates is also incomplete. Interest rates on saving deposits and 
other saving schemes such as National Savings Certificates, public provident funds etc. 
remain regulated.7 Such rigidities reduce the effectiveness of the transmission of monetary 
policy. The lending rate for advances of over Rs. 200000 was subjected to a ceiling of 
16.5 per cent in 1987-88. This was eventually removed in 1994. The Prime Lending 
Rate (PLR) was set as a floor rate and banks are now free to set lending rates without any 
upper restriction. The lending rates though, officially flexible, are affected by public sector 
banks which are the dominant players in the banking sector. These banks offer rates below 
the PLR because of their advantage in market share and quality of borrowers. Therefore 
other banks’ lending rates do not diverge much from the rates set by PSBs thereby making 
PLR ineffective.
7In fact, few allies in the newly formed United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government are demanding 
a rise in the interest rates on various provident fund schemes.
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The banks still have to make some loans based totally on the political agenda of the 
government. For example banks are forced to provide concessional loans to individuals or 
firms belonging to scheduled caste or scheduled tribes.
2.4.1 H igh Transaction Costs
One of the major concerns of the banking sector is the high transaction costs involved in 
the lending operations of banks. Transaction costs are particularly high in rural sector 
areas which is one of the priority sectors defined by government. Puhazhendhi (1995) 
estimated the transaction costs of lending to the rural poor in India. He considered two 
major commercial banks, one regional rural bank and one private commercial bank from 
the southern states of Tamil Nadu and Kerala. The estimated transaction cost was 3.68 
per cent of the loan amount if the loan was delivered through a direct lending channel. The 
literature on micro-credit (see (Ghatak, 2000) and (de Aghion and Gollier, 2000)) argues 
that group lending to the poor through Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and 
Self-Help Groups (SHGs) may be an efficient method of credit delivery system. In 1991, 
the RBI initiated the policy of encouraging direct linkages between the banks and NGOs 
and SHGs due to the presence of high transaction costs. Puhazhendhi (1995) estimated 
the financial intermediation of NGOs and SHGs reduced transaction costs by between 21 
and 41 per cent relative to the direct lending channel. In spite of these efforts transaction 
costs remain high even after a decade of reform. The estimated opportunity cost of existing 
high transaction costs in India is still high.8
Though heading in the right direction, prudential norms are yet to reach global standards. 
The pace of restructuring nationalized banks through privatization is slow. This is mainly
8To quote RBI Governor Y.V. Reddy:“The transaction costs are a drag on the economy and it is time 
to put emphasis on their reduction which can facilitate the growth of GDP by 2 to 3 per cent. (November 
3, 2003, http://www.rediff.com/money/2003/nov/03credl0.htm)
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because nationalized banks’ balance sheets are weak due to accumulated NPAs over the 
past three decades. The government needs to clean up balance sheets by recapitalization 
and other measures in order to make these banks more attractive to investors. Given recent 
trends on the magnitude of NPAs (Table 2.5) the cost of restructuring appears to be very 
high, particularly since it is already running very high deficits.
Table 2.5: Non Performing Assets of Commercial Banking Sector: 1997-2003
Year Public Sector 
Banks
Old Private 
Sector Banks
New Private 
Sector Banks
Foreign Banks 
in India
1997 17.80 10.70 2.60 4.30
1998 16.00 10.90 3.50 6.40
1999 15.90 13.10 6.20 7.60
2000 14.00 10.80 4.10 7.00
2001 12.40 11.10 5.10 6.80
2002 11.09 11.01 8.86 5.38
2003 9.36 8.90 7.64 5.22
Definition: Gross NPA/Gross Advances (%) 
Source: RBI (2003b)
Such liabilities on the government to revive the banking sector (contingent liabilities), are 
significant in the case of India. The impact of contingent liabilities is now examined.
2.4.2 C ontingent Liabilities
The financial sector in transition and developing economies is characterized by poor regu­
latory and enforcement systems, and inadequate disclosure of information which may lead 
to a high incidence of NPAs. When the banking sector is in stress, out of legal obliga­
tion or political compulsion the central government has to rescue the banks. Such public 
financing by government represents its contingent liabilities and can potentially lead to a 
large increase in public debt. Because of their uncertain nature these contingent liabilities
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are unbudgeted and, hence, are hidden fiscal risks.
Contingent liabilities are also important because the government cannot achieve its long- 
run objective of a sound fiscal system without addressing the problem. Explicit contingent 
liabilities are specific obligations which the government has to settle under a contract or a 
law. These include obligations issued to state governments and public sector banks, etc. 
The government can foresee such guarantees and includes them in its budget constraint.9
However, contingent liabilities or implicit liabilities are uncertain and their realization is 
dependent on the probability of particular events. Sometimes, these events could be totally 
exogenous to government policy, e.g., an earthquake or any other natural disaster. Most 
of the time, these liabilities are a result of government policy. One interesting example 
is a guarantee extended by government to foreign creditors of domestic banks. These 
guarantees may lead to moral hazard problems in the banking sector as banks may take 
high risks, eventually leading to default on foreign loans, and pressure on the government 
to bail them out because of public expectations or political compulsion. One relevant case 
study in this regard is the crisis in the UTI mutual fund discussed in the Appendix A.
Contingent implicit liabilities are normally calculated after the event occurs, as they are 
dependent on the probability of the triggering event, the actual loss and the amount govern­
ment pays to bail out the system. (Polackova, 1999) notes the financial systems represent 
the most serious contingent implicit liability. For example the cost of resolving past bank­
ing crises varies from around 1 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Thailand 
1983-87) to around 55 per cent of GDP (Argentina 1980-82) depending on the state of 
the financial system. Standard and Poor’s (Polackova, 1999) estimate the fiscal cost of a 
future banking crisis in India will be around 15 per cent of GDP. This is so high because 
of the persistent inefficiencies in the banking system even after a decade of financial reform
9Australian and New Zealand governments currently report such liabilities in their balance sheets.
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(Bhattacharya and Patel, 2003). Bhattacharya and Patel (2003) put the estimate of gov­
ernment guarantees in India as around 12 per cent of GDP. Hence government guarantees 
are a crucial part of analysis of a financial sector especially in developing economies.
The overview of the reform process brings up the question of policy reversal which is 
covered in the next section.
2.5 Policy Reversal
Most of the financial reforms in the Indian economy were guided by " ... objectives of 
increasing operational efficacy of monetary policy....” (RBI, 1997, page 1-9). It is argued 
that under current inefficiencies (especially high NPAs and the large share of government 
ownership) in the banking sector, any efforts by government to ensure macroeconomic 
stabilization (say reduction in fiscal deficit) or restructuring will involve an offsetting effect, 
adversely affecting the initial policy objectives, which will transmit mainly through the 
financial sector. This offsetting effect can subsequently cause what can be termed a “policy 
reversal” by government. Such policy reversals can arise under several conditions some of 
which are:
• Suppose government is running high deficits and implements a tight monetary policy 
by increasing interest rates. Due to the inflexibility of the banking sector in passing 
on interest rates rise this will lead to banking stress. This inflexibility arises mainly 
because of the government’s policy of directed and concessional lending to priority 
sectors. Because of a regulated interest rate regime, the banks cannot adjust their 
deposit rates much, say in the, area of savings deposits. Thus stress in the banking 
sector will be directly reflected in a higher incidence of NPAs in balance sheets. 
This may force the government to revive the banking sector through measures like
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recapitalization which will be a direct burden on government budget. As discussed 
earlier, the cost of reviving banks is very high in the case of India. The government 
indeed began a partial privatization of banks as part of its economic reform process 
initially providing Rs. 40 billion from 1991-92 to 1992-93 to 19 nationalized banks. 
Subsequently, the government has spent around Rs. 164.5 billion at a rate of between 
0.02 and 0.7 per cent of GDP each year from 1993-99. Though there was a decline 
in NPAs from 17.8 per cent in 1997 to 11.4 per cent in 2002 they are still very high.
• A second reason for policy reversal is the existence of weak regulatory and supervisory 
framework in the Indian Banking sector. The UTI mutual funds crisis is an example 
of this (See Appendix A).
2.6 C onclusion
The present chapter has reviewed the financial sector reform process in India focussing 
on the banking sector. It can be safely concluded that financial sector reform in India 
is incomplete. The banking sector remains inefficient because of several factors viz. high 
reserves and liquidity requirements, a poor regulatory and supervisory framework, the 
presence of implicit government guarantees, high transaction costs etc. These inefficiencies 
can adversely affect the long-term policy objectives of a sound fiscal system and can even 
lead to policy reversals.
The next chapter will formally model policy reversals emanating from the stabilization 
efforts of government. The chapter proposes a theoretical framework to highlight linkages 
between the stabilization efforts of government and inefficiencies of the banking sector. 
The major characteristics of an underdeveloped financial sector as discussed in this chapter 
are explicitly incorporated in a general equilibrium setup. In particular, the theoretical
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framework incorporates the: a) high transaction costs of making loans, b) presence of 
government guarantees, c) government intervention in exchange rate markets reflected by 
the exogenous rate of depreciation and d) restrictive capital controls captured through the 
risk premium of investing in the economy.
Chapter 3
Fiscal Deßcits, Banking Crises and 
Adjustment Policy in a Semi-Open
Economy
3.1 Introduction
A stable fiscal environment is a primary government objective. When faced with high 
budget deficits that may threaten public debt sustainability, the literature emphasizes the 
need to adopt appropriate policy measures including fiscal adjustment through expenditure 
cuts, tax hikes and related reforms (Blanchard and Perotti, 1999),(Römer and Römer, 
2002). Therefore the effects policies enacted to ensure fiscal consolidation will have on the 
macroeconomic equilibrium of the economy is an important issue. In the particular case of 
developing countries there may be hard choices to make between fiscal consolidation and 
steady growth of the financial and real sectors of the economy. An other important issue 
is the intertemporal sustainability of the fiscal deficit i.e., will consolidation have a long 
lasting effect or will the fiscal deficit eventually reappear necessitating policy adjustments?1
1 An important question becomes whether public debt is sustainable over a long horizon. This question 
is analyzed for the case of India in chapter 4. ^
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This chapter constructs a model that incorporates this tradeoff. The implications of sta­
bilization policy in the context of an economy with broad characteristics as discussed in 
chapter 2 are considered and impact on key macroeconomic variables as well as profitabil­
ity of the banking sector is analyzed. Under some conditions, these effects necessitate an 
endogenous policy reversal. This possibility has not been examined by the extant literature.
Consider a developing economy with the following characteristics: a) high transaction 
costs of lending, b) managed exchange rate regime, c) imperfect capital mobility and d) 
presence of contingent liabilities or government guarantees. In response to high deficits 
a stabilization policy is undertaken. Without loss of generality, this policy is assumed to 
take the form of monetary restraint.2 This restraint is introduced as an exogenous change 
in a general equilibrium macroeconomic model with optimizing banks, firms and household 
workers with endogenous government policy. The model predicts the effects of this change 
cn the endogenous choice variables of each of the participants and, in particular, the 
profitability of the banking sector. Under certain circumstances these changes may induce 
&n endogenous policy reversal on the part of government.
The principal objective of this chapter is to develop a stylized model of the interaction 
between the fiscal and banking sector during a period of stabilization characterized by 
f.scal and monetary restraint to allow for endogenous policy reversal. Subsequently the 
empirical predictions of this model are tested using Indian data.
The model developed in this chapter broadly follows the empirical regularities noted in 
section 2.4. There are four groups of competitive agents: banks, households, firms and 
government. The banks are assumed to be perfectly competitive, borrowing from domestic 
cepositors and foreign creditors. They borrow in dollars from abroad and lend in the 
heal currency thereby exposing themselves to exchange rate risk. Three assumptions are
2It will be shown in section 3.2.2 that this is equivalent to a restrictive budgetary policy.
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introduced in the model which typically characterize developing economies and are key 
sources of inefficiency in the banking sector. These assumptions are:
a) Banks incur transaction costs while generating credit. As chapter 2 points out, the high 
transaction costs of lending adversely affect output growth.
b) The government issues contingent liabilities as a guarantee to foreign creditors in case 
the bank defaults on foreign borrowings.
c) There exists a risk premium reflected by the positive gap between the domestic nominal 
interest rate and the world nominal interest rate.
Foreign creditors determine the rate of lending on the basis of this information. Banks 
work out their optimal strategy given the borrowing rate they face and the guarantees 
against default provided by government.
Households derive utility from consumption and leisure, provide labor, own firms, spend 
against deposits held in banks and face a cash-in-advance constraint when making pur­
chases. Firms produce the only output in the economy by a single factor of production 
(labor) using constant returns to scale technology. The government satisfies its intertem­
poral budget constraint.3
The model highlights the monetary transmission mechanism through the bank lending 
channel and thus fits in the literature which emphasizes the importance of banks in mone­
tary policy transmission. The literature on the bank lending channel argues that if banks 
are the main source of credit generation or bank loans are imperfect substitutes for other 
assets in the economy, monetary policy can be effectively and independently transmitted 
through changes in bank loans (Kashyap and Stein, 1994). This literature can be divided 
into two main strands: the first comprises the earlier studies (e.g., Brunner and Meitzer
3This assumption is justified ex ante as the government would attempt to meet the solvency conditions. 
As chapter 4 reveals in the case of Indian economy this turns out to be true.
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(1964), Tobin (1969) and Modigliani (1963)). These include general equilibrium models 
of financial intermediation with imperfect substitutability across assets. The main argu­
ment of these studies is that since bank loans are imperfect substitutes for other assets, 
the interest rates in the economy will not change instantly (indicating existence of “price 
stickiness” ) and hence monetary policy may remain effective.
The second literature strand comprises the more recent studies that focus on the importance 
of gaps between the expected returns of lenders and the cost faced by borrowers called the 
“external finance premium” (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). These gaps can arise due to 
imperfections in the credit market: moral hazard and the costs of monitoring loans (Pankki, 
2003) (Sinn, 2001), no deposit insurance (Webb, 2000), transaction costs (Edwards and 
Vegh, 1997), other adjustment costs (Elyasiani et al., 1995) and regulated interest rate 
regimes (Demetriades and Luintel, 1996). Any monetary policy measure, say an increase 
in the interest rate, will increase the premium, thereby increasing the cost of borrowing 
and subsequently lowering investment and real activity. Hence these gaps tend to move 
in the direction of monetary policy and have a magnifying effect. On similar lines the 
theoretical framework in this chapter is characterized by lending and deposit spreads as 
the main driving forces of the model.
In trying to explain the role of government guarantees the current theoretical framework is 
related to the literature on government guarantees which has mainly focussed on the recent 
South East Asian crisis (See Mckinnon and Pill (1998), Burnside et al. (2001), Corsetti 
et al. (1998b), Alejandro-Diaz (1985), Dooley (2000) among others). For example, Burnside 
et al. (2001) discuss a framework in which banks are reluctant to hedge their exchange rate 
risks arising from foreign borrowings because of the presence of government guarantees. 
They further develop a self-fulfilling framework in which government contingent liabilities 
are transformed into actual liabilities. However, their model is not credit constrained and
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they do not consider any other distortions in the economy.
In order to understand the recent experiences of policy reversals in India, as discussed in 
chapter 2, it is imperative to model a banking sector which is simultaneously subjected to 
credit market distortions and government policy like presence of government guarantees. 
Therefore, the model used in this chapter is a substantial extension of the extant literature 
and more applicable to the observed empirical regularities and policy framework of select 
developing countries, particularly India.
The model is an extension of the framework used by Edwards and Vegh (1997)4 who discuss 
the magnification of macroeconomic disturbances via the banking sector thereby emphasiz­
ing the ‘bank lending channel’. It is argued that in the case of developing economies banks 
are not mere ‘propagators’ of the crisis but may actually be the cause.5 In addition to the 
above, and as mentioned earlier, this approach enables an endogenous policy reversal to 
be modeled in respect of the government’s stabilization efforts. As mentioned in section 
2.4 the possibility has been very much present in India and cannot be explained by extant 
models.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops a general equilibrium model with four 
agents with the characteristics required for analysis: households, firms, banks and govern­
ment. The third section characterizes the equilibrium by simulating the effects of some 
exogenous shocks to the economy. Section 4 empirically tests the transmission mechanism 
of the model using Indian data. As is the practice in the literature, a reduced form VAR 
approach and Generalized Impulse Response Function (GIRF) are used to investigate the 
impact of an exogenous shock to the economy. It is concluded that the empirical evidence
4This chapter focusses on one of the extensions suggested by Edwards and Vegh (1997): “....the govern­
ment’s role in providing the credit to the banking sector in moments of distress appears as an important 
item on the agenda”.
5 An empirical analysis in chapter 5 concludes banks indeed play a crucial role in the transmission of 
monetary policy.
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is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 The Model
A small open economy characterized by imperfect capital mobility and a managed exchange 
rate regime is considered. For these reasons it is referred to as a semi-open economy. There 
are four competitive agents: banks, households, firms and government. There is only one 
good (tradable and non-storable) produced. Let the domestic price of this good be Pt 
(=etP*) where et is the nominal exchange rate and Pf* is the world price of this good. 
Foreign inflation is 7rt* and thus domestic inflation is given by:
where t t is the devaluation rate in the economy. Initially the economy is in a fixed exchange 
rate regime with non-zero probability of devaluation (as discussed below). Hence the rate of 
devaluation is zero. There is only one source of uncertainty in the economy: the possibility 
of future exchange rate fluctuation. The exchange rate is given by:
7Tt =  7T* 4- et (3.1)
e =
e1 with probability (1-q) 
eD with probability q
where e1 is the exchange rate in the initial time period and eD is the exchange rate after 
devaluation. Thus it is implicitly assumed the central bank has some kind of exchange rate 
targeting mechanism in place which is true for India as discussed in section 2.3.
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The world real interest rate (rt) facing the economy, as implied by the Fisher equation is:
rt =  t? -  7T?
where i\ is the nominal interest rate in the rest of the world.
Capital mobility implies that:
it = i*t +9  ,0 >  0
where 9 can be perceived as the risk premium of investing in the economy. Interest rate 
risk assumes that:
it — f't T  T 9 (3-2)
3.2.1 Banking Sector
Banks are perfectly competitive. They borrow from domestic households (domestic de­
posits — dt) and foreign creditors (foreign borrowings^*) and lend to domestic borrowers 
(firms) with Lt denoting loans. Foreign borrowing are in dollars (S) which are converted 
to rupees (Rs.) and then loaned domestically. Thus banks are exposed to exchange rate 
risks. Let d* be banks’ foreign borrowing in dollars. The amount of domestic lending to 
firms, is say, Rs. Le1. Hence banks use the domestic demand deposits (dt) and foreign 
borrowing (d*) to lend Rs. Le1 to firms which creates an equal value of deposits. Hence 
banks’ total demand deposits can be perceived as the sum of dt and Le1 on which banks 
have to pay the deposit rate of interest High powered money is
ht — Mt -f- e1 d*t (3.3)
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where Mt is the domestic money supply.
Here, by definition, Mt =  dt as households do not hold cashrin-hand and use their de­
posits for consumption. Assume that ip is the reserve requirement ratio determined by the 
government and hence the banks can only lend (1 -ip) part of their total deposits. Thus 
alternatively ht can be defined as:
ht = ip(dt +  e1 Lt) (3.4)
Assume that banks incur a transaction cost of 5L in making loans to firms. Banks’ assets
consist of:
• High powered money ht. No interest is paid on the reserves. Hence the opportunity 
cost of holding ht is itht.
• Credit to firms Lt. Banks’ interest rate earnings from the credit are i\L t where i[ is 
the banks’ lending rate.
The banks’ liabilities consist of:
• Interest on its total deposits base (dt + e1 Lt) which is if(dt +  e1 Lt) where if is the 
banks’ deposit rate.
• Foreign Borrowing d$: The total interest payment to the foreign borrowers is i\d*t 
where ibt is the interest rate at which the foreign borrowers lend to domestic banks. 
Total cost of borrowing depends on the government policy and may be different from
itd l
Thus the representative banks’ net profit (in $) from lending operations is given by:
7Tt — Lt/et — 5Lt +  ht/&t ~ hht/^t 4- i t d t / ~  if (.̂ t +  e1 Lt)/ &t — ifd* (3.5)
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which is also equal to net worth of the banks (V B).
Foreign investors are assumed to be risk neutral. Hence the expected return on the credit 
is r t , the risk free world real interest rate. The actual rate at which the foreign creditors 
will lend to the bank (ib) may be different from rt due to the uncertainty involved in 
the exchange rate regime. The banks are solvent and can fully repay foreign creditors 
if V B > ibd .̂ In the reverse case where VB < ibtdf, banks are unable to honor their 
borrowings and it is assumed that government comes to the banks’ rescue and pays part of 
the foreign borrowings to banks on condition that they have to contribute the remaining 
amount towards the full payment to foreign creditors (the expected value of which is 
rdjr).6 It is assumed that government cannot renege on its guarantees, ex post as financial 
stability appears to be an important argument in the government’s objective function in 
India. One example is the UTI mutual fund crisis discussed in Appendix A, where under 
tremendous pressure after initial reluctance the government had to bail the fund out. The 
determination of the foreign borrowing rate of banks will now be discussed.
D eterm ination  o f i\
Foreign creditors being risk neutral will set i\ in such a way that their expected gross return 
is equal to the risk free world interest rate rt. It is assumed that foreign creditors have full 
knowledge of the government’s policy and hence are assured of at least rtd*t even if banks 
are on the verge of insolvency. Hence foreign creditors set i\ in such a way that:
nd*t = (1 -  q)i\d*t +  q(rtd*t ) (3.6)
which implies that in financial market equilibrium ib = rt. Therefore it can be concluded
6Such a policy can be considered analogous to the government’s policy to introduce a set of performance 
obligations and commitments to avoid the problems of moral hazard. For example, in 1992/93, the RBI 
introduced some performance agreements through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which needed 
to be fulfilled as a precondition, by the banks’ receiving recapitalization benefits (Shirai, 2002).
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that in the presence of government bank guarantees foreign creditors are willing7 to lend 
at the risk-free world interest rate rt. The real cost of borrowing for banks will also be 
different from ihtd*t . The bank’s cost function is now derived.
B anks’ Cost Function:
When solvent, banks’ borrowing costs will be i\d*t < V B. When banks become insolvent, 
government intervenes and it is assumed that government pays fraction $rd*t to the banks 
and banks have to make a contribution of (1 -  Cjrdl in order to cover their losses.
Thus the real cost of borrowing for the banks in the presence of government guarantees is 
given by:
CB = q{ 1 -  c)rd* +  (1 -  q)rd*t =  (1 -  qs)rd*t (3.7)
Here it is assumed that the government decides s in such a way that V B(et) > (1 — c)rd*.8 
Banks’ profits from the lending Eq.(3.5) can be re-written as
7tb =  ilte! Lt/et -  SLt +  ht/e t -  itht/e t +  itdt/et -  idt (dt +  e % ) /e t -  (1 -  qs)rd*t (3.8)
The expected profit of the bank in the presence of government guarantees is given by:
Qbt = E(ttl ) (3.9)
7It should be noted that in the absence of government guarantees i£ will be determined by attaching 
a markup of (jr^) on the real interest rate. Hence, alternatively, government guarantees neutralize the 
effect of exchange rate uncertainty.
8In the extreme case when q =  1 the government alone pays the whole amount of foreign borrowings. 
It is assumed that c <  1 and the risk of devaluation will be shared by the banks and the government.
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The present discounted value of the banks’ real profits is given by:
poo poo
/ e~rtDbdt = / { f y - f y e 1 Lt/e t-6Lt+rht/et-itht/et + (it-it)dt/et-(l-q<;)rd*t }e~rtdt
Jo Jo
(3.10)
Substituting Eq. (3.8) in Eq.(3.9) and using equations (3.3) and (3.4), Eq. (3.10) can be 
rewritten as:
poo poo J I p l T
/  e~rtDbdt = / {(4 -  fye1 Lt/et -  6Lt + (r -  ---------)) +
Jo Jo et
+ ( i t - i t )dt/et-(l-q<;)r[(-
The bank maximizes the present discounted value of Db by choosing Lt,dt subject to 
equations (3.3)) and (3.4) Hence:
The first order conditions (FOC’s) axe: 
w.r.t Lt:
— [(4 “  it) +  (r  “  it) \̂ =& + ( l -  qs)ri/j
Rearranging and using Eq. (3.2):
— [(4 -  ii)] =S + { 1 -  qq)r^ +  (0 +  <)V>et
w.r.t dt: which equates
j[(U -  if) + (r -  it)ip\ = ^(1 -  qq)(il> -  l)r
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Rearranging and using Eq. (3.2)
^[(*t -  i t ) }  +  -  «0(1  -  'l> )r  O ’/»
The first FOC (w.r.t.L*) equates the marginal gain from lending operations (profit from 
the lending spread (ilt — if)) to the marginal cost of lending comprising:
• The per unit transaction cost of making loans (6)
• The cost of foreign borrowings to the banks attached to a one unit increase in domestic 
credit (adjusted for the reserve requirement ratio): (1 — qCjr'ip
• The per unit opportunity cost of reserve requirement ratio and imperfect capital 
mobility: (6 +  7q*)V>
The second FOC (w.r.t. dt) equates the marginal profits from deposit making comprising:
• The marginal profit from lending spread: (it — if)
• The marginal savings in the cost of foreign borrowings attached to a one unit increase 
in domestic deposits adjusted by reserve requirement ratio: ^ (1  — ,0)(1 — qC)r
to the marginal cost of deposits: per unit opportunity cost of the reserve requirement ratio 
and imperfect capital mobility: (6 +  7r*)-i/>
Solving the FOC’s and using Eq. (3.2) can solve for the deposit and lending rate:
The deposit rate is:
if =  (1 -  -0)[*< +  | j ( l  -  9?)r] +  rtj> (3-11)
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Thus the deposit rate in the economy has three components:
(i) i* + ff(l—qq)r: This is the sum of the cost of domestic deposits (it) and the cost of foreign 
borrowings (^-(1 -  qq)r). (ii) This total cost is then adjusted for the reserve requirement 
ratio((l — VO)-9 (iii) rip is the opportunity cost to banks for holding reserves. Thus the 
deposit rate is always less than the total cost of deposits.
The banks’ lending rate is :
ilt = H+  | j [ ( l  ~  qs)r +  <5] (3.12)
The lending rate in the economy is determined by the total cost of banks’ deposits, which 
has two components: cost of domestic deposits (it) and cost of foreign borrowings (ff [(1 — 
qs)r]) plus the transaction cost of creating loans.
3.2.2 Governm ent
The government earns revenue by imposing a lump sum tax, generates seignorage revenue 
and issues debt. The revenue is spent on purchases of the single good and transfer pay­
ments made to banks, subject to operations satisfying intertemporal government budget 
constraint. This constraint is developed below.
Spending:
Government spending consists of:
1. Purchase of the tradable good Gt. Total government purchases of the good in dollars 
is : Gt/et
ĝ (it + ff (1 -  q<;)r) the opportunity cost of holding the reserves.
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2. Transfer Payments: The government makes transfer payments to banks in case they 
default on foreign borrowings: Tb. The expected value of the transfers is given by:
The value of government transfers to banks is essentially the cost incurred by the 
government to bail out the banks which equals qsrd*t
Revenues:
The government finances its expenditure by taxes, printing money and issuing debt:
1. Taxes(r): The government impose a lump sum tax on households. Take lump sum 
tax in dollars as rfL.
2. Seignorage revenue is given by: ht/et -f TTtht/et dollars
3. Debt: The government lends and borrows in dollars at rate r. It is assumed that 
government issues bonds of face value B  in local currency (to households) at the 
interest rate r. Then the dollar value of debt is: Br/e t.
Hence the government’s flow budget constraint is:
Integrating forward and assuming the no-Ponzi condition: (Limt^ rtbt = 0) gives
T = ( l - q)0 + q(Tb) (3.13)
(3.14)
f>t =  rbt +  rB /et + Gt/et +  — rt — ht/e t - (3.15)
■OO
(rB /et - r t + Gt/et + V -  ht/et -  TTtht/et)e rtdt = 0 (3.16)
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which can be re-written as:
b0 + I r B /e te rtd t=  /  (rt -  Gt/e t - T ) e  rtd t+  /  {ht/e t +  TTtht/e t)e rtdt
J o  J o  J o
The above equation is the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. This requires the
dollar value of initial debt plus the present discounted value of total holdings by issuing
bonds to be equal to the present discounted value of surpluses and seignorage revenue.
3.2.3 H ouseholds
The household utility function is given by:
/•O O
/  [log(ct) +  log(xt)\e~ßtdt
J o
(3.17)
where c* is consumption and x t leisure of individual households. Assuming total time 
endowment of unity, the labor supply is given by 1 — x t. The flow budget constraint facing 
the household is:
a!l =  raj1 +  wt( 1 -  x t) +  r B /e t +  Qft /e t -  Ct -  r f  -  (it -  it)dt/e t (3.18)
where aj1 are households assets, wt the wage rate, and firm’s profit (since households 
own firms).
It is assumed that households don’t hold cash and conduct all transactions using deposits, 
hence the “deposit-in-advance” ’ constraint is:
dt/e t = get (3.19)
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Thus the household incurs an opportunity cost of (it — if) for holding the deposits. Inte­
grating forward and assuming the no-Ponzi game condition gives:
roo
0 =  ao +  /  i wt{ 1 ~  xt) + rB/et +  Dft / e t - C t -  rtL -  (it -  if)dt/et}e~rtdt (3.20) 
Jo
Households maximize utility Eq. (3.17) subject to the budget constraint Eq. (3.20) and 
cash-in-advance constraint Eq. (3.19) by choosing C t , x t . The first order conditions for 
utility maximization are:
w.r.t c*:
i  =  A [l+ » /(» « -$ ]  (3.21)
Ct
This equation equates the marginal utility of consumption (l/c*)to the marginal utility of 
income (A) times the effective price of good (1+ 77(2* — if)) where the effective price of good 
is given by its market price plus the cost associated with holding the money (in the form 
of demand deposits) to purchase one unit of the good, 
w.r.t xt:
— =  Aw, (3.22)
i t
This equation equates the marginal utility of leisure to marginal utility of income (A) 
times the real wage rate. As per the utility function the marginal utility of income remains 
constant.
Opportunity cost of holding deposits is (it — if) which is given as:
i t - i d, =  W  + 6)4> ~ J [ ( l  -  ??)(! -  i>)r] (3.23)
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3.2 .4  Firm s
For the sake of simplicity it is assumed the firm’s production technology is given by:
y = Al (3.24)
where y is the aggregate output in the economy and l is the labor input, the only factor 
of production used to produce the output. Firms pay their wage bill by using the bank 
credit Lt. Hence:
e’Lt =  7wtk (3.25)
Assume firms’ assets consist of foreign-traded bonds (b{) and that their liability is Lt. 
Hence
a{ =  b{-
■where a{ are the total assets of the firms at any given time t. The change in the firm's 
assets is defined by
a{ =  rb{ +  yt/e t -  wtlt/et -  {i\ -  i ^ L t / e t  -  ü { /e t (3.26)
Integrating forward and assuming the no-Ponzi game condition, the Present Discounted 
Value (PDV) of the firm’s profit is given by:
poo poo
/  Ft{e~rtd t=  /  {rb{ + yt/e t -  wtlt/e t -  (ilt -  i ^ e 1 Lt/e t}e~rtdt (3.27)
Jo Jo
Firms will maximize PDV of their profits by choosing lt . The first order condition after 
using Eq. (3.24) is: 
w.r.t lt \
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A = ^ [ l + 7 (i‘t - i? )e l l (3.28)
e*
Eq. (3.28) requires that in profit maximizing equilibrium firms equate the marginal pro­
ductivity of labor to the marginal cost of unit labor which is the sum of the wage rate and 
the cost associated with holding credit in order to pay wages.
The opportunity cost of holding credit is given by the difference between the lending rates 
earned by firms and the deposit rates they pay (i\ — if). Thus:
ilt ~  it = W  +  W  + +  (1 -  Qs)ipr] (3.29)
3.2.5 A ggregate R esource Constraint
According to the model specification, government finances are generated by firms’ and 
bank profits and households’ budget constraint. Hence the aggregate resource constraint 
can be found by adding the present discounted value of firm (Eq. (3.27)) and banks’ 
profits (Eq.(3.10)) and households’ budget constraint (Eq.(3.20)) and subtracting the gov­
ernment’s inter temporal budget constraint (Eq. (3.16)). Using Eq. (3.2), labor market 
equilibrium: lt = 1 — x t and Eq. (3.13), the aggregate resource constraint in the economy 
is given by:
poo poo
ao +  /  (yt +  (ht/et -  6ht/et))e~rtdt = (ct +  Gt/et +  6Lt 4- rd*t )e~rtdt (3.30)
Jo
where a0 = aft + — b0 The equation implies consumption, government purchases, trans­
action costs and foreign borrowings are financed by the output and seignorage revenue net 
of the risk premium earned on high powered money.
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3.3 E qu ilib rium
The model can be solved for all endogenous variables {quantities: ct, x t, ht , Lu dt , It, yt\ 
prices: wt, i\ , ilt,} such that:
(i) Q, xt maximize household’s utility function given the prices
(ii) yt, It solve the firms’ profit maximization problem given the prices
(iii) dt,L t,h t solve banks’ maximization problem
(iv) The government’s intertemporal budget constraint holds
(v) The money market clears with Mt = dt
(vi) The labor market clears with lt — 1 — xt
The equilibrium values of the endogenous variables are reported in Appendix B.
3.3.1 Im pact of Exogenous Shocks
The transmission mechanisms in the economy are now explored by introducing some one- 
period exogenous shocks. Four types of shocks are considered: a productivity shock fol­
lowing a drop in the marginal productivity of the factor of production (labor), A, foreign 
interest rate shock due to a sharp rise in world interest rate r, monetary shock resulting 
from an increase in the reserve requirement ratio iß and a foreign inflation shock arising 
from, say, an increase in the world prices of oil. Table 3.1 summarizes the signs of the 
marginal effects of these shocks on the principal endogenous variables.
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The intuition behind some of the signs in Table 3.1 follows:
• Inflationary shock: Suppose that due to fluctuations in the world business cycle 
foreign inflation increases. This results in an increase in the domestic inflation rate 
through Eq. (3.1). Equation (3.23) states that the cost of consumption will increase. 
Households will reduce consumption which will, via the deposit-in-advance constraint 
from Eq. (3.19), reduce the demand for deposits, and households will withdraw some 
deposits. Firms’ opportunity cost of holding credit (from Eq.(3.29)) increases with 
the higher inflation rate and hence the real wage rate falls. Lower real wage rates 
lead to lower employment since labor supply falls. The demand for credit also falls 
because of the credit-in-advance constraint (Eq. (3.25)). Thus banks face a reduction 
in domestic deposits and a lower demand for credit.
This situation may lead to a fall in the net worth of the banks such that V B < rdt* 
and the government has to come to their rescue.
• World interest rate shock: Assume the world real interest rate rises. This will lead 
to a rise in the lending and deposit rates. The opportunity cost to firms for holding 
credit will increase and will reduce credit demand. Firms will also cut the real wage 
rate resulting in a cut in labor supply and hence aggregate output. On the other 
hand, due to an increase in the deposit rate, households will find it more lucrative to 
hold deposits and hence the level of deposits will rise leading to higher consumption 
via deposit -in-advance constraint (Eq. (3.19)). Higher consumption also indicate 
a fall in the price of consumption and hence it — if will decrease. From the banks’ 
perspective, an interest rate shock will result in lower credit demand and a higher 
level of deposits.
• Increase in the reserve requirement ratio: An increase in ip will decrease the deposit 
rate (from Eq. (3.11)) as banks decide their deposit rate on the basis of funds
CHAPTER 3. FISCAL DEFICIT AND BANKING CRISES 62
available for transaction. The lending rate of banks will remain unaffected. This will 
lead to an increase in i\ — if which will reduce the demand for credit by firms, reduce 
the wage rate, employment and aggregate output. The reduction in the deposit rate 
will increase it — if reducing the demand for deposits and consumption. Households 
will prefer to withdraw their money. Hence the economy faces a liquidity crunch with 
lower demand for credit and deposits.
• Productivity shock: The interest rates will remain unaffected by a decline in the 
productivity of factor of production (labor), A, keeping the level of consumption 
and deposits unaffected. However it will be an adverse shock to firms’ technology 
reducing output which leads to a reduction in the real wage rate, employment level, 
and, hence, the demand for credit (via Eq. (3.25)).
• Stricter controls on capital mobility: Such a government policy will result in an 
increase in the value of 6. This will have exactly same effect as an increase in the 
domestic inflation rate as they both are related by Eq. (3.2).
It should be noted that some of these adverse shocks may be induced by the govern­
ment stabilization efforts.10 Any shock that leads to a slowdown in economic activity and 
threaten banks’ solvency leading to a default in foreign credit may provoke government 
intervention. When banks face financial distress, government has to contribute its share* 11 
qardl towards foreign credit. It is now argued that under the assumptions of the model, 
for a developing economy, the offsetting effect can only be eliminated in the following cases:
a) Absence of government guarantees (a =  0). This is very unlikely in developing countries 
because of the political benefits of these guarantees.
b) No exchange rate uncertainty in the economy (q = 0): This is the only factor ame-
10Increase in the interest rate, reserve requirement ratio or stricter capital controls.
11 This share can be perceived as the offsetting effect of the initial stabilization effort.
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liorating the effect of risk. This scenario basically depends on agents’ confidence in the 
economy and local currency. It is assumed that the government is initially running deficits 
high enough that agents expect a positive value from the probability of devaluation in the 
economy.
c) Absence of foreign borrowings by banks (d\ = 0): Banks will not borrow from foreign 
creditors if the economy’s demand for credit is fully satisfied by domestic deposits net of 
reserve requirements. This condition implies that (1 — ip)dt = 'ipe1 Lt or xjf — efLj +dt -12 
Hence government will have to adopt a loose monetary policy by reducing the reserve 
requirement ratio to the extent that the demand for domestic credit is satisfied by available 
domestic demand deposits. Thus the effort by the government to reduce its contribution 
towards bank bailouts may actually lead to an additional burden on its deficits through 
loose monetary policy. Thus it can be concluded that under the assumptions of this model, 
with every effort of deficit reduction by the government there will be an offsetting effect 
tending to undermine the initial effort of stabilization.
The theoretical framework is now tested empirically using Indian data.
12It should be noted that for any > 0, ip  >  i p * .
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3.4 E m pirical A nalysis
The purpose of this section is to empirically test the transmission of shocks as described 
in the theoretical model. Such an analysis will aid in identifying the proximity of the 
“theoretical setup” . The data spans the period 1990-2000 reported in the Handbook of 
Statistics on Indian Economy published by the RBI (RBI, 2003e) and International Finance 
Statistics (IFS). This period is chosen because it is the decade characterized by major 
economic reform in India which has significantly affected the domestic banking sector 
(Saez, 2001) (Shirai, 2002).
3.4.1 M ethodology
The most desirable approach will be to use a large-scale structural macroeconometric 
model, solve the simultaneous equation system for endogenous variables to get reduced 
form equations and then use the dynamic multipliers to analyze the impact of shock in the 
system.13 This approach cannot be applied here mainly because of the lack of availability 
of high frequency data for some of the key endogenous variables in the model i.e., wage 
rate, consumption, foreign borrowings, labor supply etc.
It is intended to use the VAR, the reduced form methodology introduced by Sims (1980).
VAR is an alternative approach measuring the reaction of macroeconomy to policy actions
(Stein and Song, 2002). Christ (1993) describes the procedure in VAR as: “ In VAR, a set
of observable variables is chosen, a maximum lag length is chosen, and the current value
of each variable is regressed on the lagged values of that variable and all other variables.
No exogenous variables exist; all observable variables are treated as endogenous. Except for
that, an VAR model is similar to the unrestricted reduced form of a conventional econo-
13Such an approach was popular in the 1960s and 1970s mostly used by Keynesians. For further discus­
sion see Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1976), Klein and Young (1980)
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metric model. ” However, the recent developments in this literature do include exogenous 
variables in the VAR (For example see Dungey and Pagan, 2000).
The impact of an exogenous shock is measured by “impulse responses” in VAR. Impulse 
responses describe the dynamics of all the variables in a VAR system to a one unit increase 
in the current value of the error terms (Stock and Watson, 2001).14 Stein and Song (2002) 
show that under some restrictions on VAR, dynamic multiplier and impulse responses turn 
out to be identical.
3.4 .2  D ata  D escription  and Selection of Variables
The analysis is done by examining the impact of a foreign interest rate shock on the major 
macroeconomic variables discussed in the model.15 It is to be noted that the major driving 
force in the model is the lending spread (i\ — if) and the deposit spread (it — if). These 
are affected by the domestic interest rate which, in turn, is directly related to the world 
interest rate through the Fisher equation (Eq. (3.2)).
The intent is to examine the impact of a shock in the world interest rate which is transmit­
ted to the economy through the domestic interest rate which affects lending and deposit 
spreads and hence all endogenous variables (output, wage, consumption, money supply, 
foreign borrowings) in the model. Thus the VAR should thus include the deposit spread, 
lending spread and domestic interest rate. The banking sector plays a crucial role in the 
transmission mechanism and hence the banks’ deposit and credit is included in the VAR 
model. Domestic output is also included in the VAR as a “representative” variable for all
14In fact the one unit increase in the error terms (also called the shock terms) are the true exogenous 
elements of VAR models.
15The analysis for other shocks is not possible due to unavailability of data. However, empirical evidence 
of one shock is sufficient to adjudge the proximity of the theoretical setup in the model to the actual data 
for a developing country.
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the other endogenous variables in the model.16 Therefore the following variables for VAR
%
are selected:
• Lending Spread: i\ — if
• Deposit Spread: it — if
• Deposit to Credit Ratio: dt/L t
• Domestic Interest rate: it
• Output: yt
Monthly data for India is used ranging from March 1990 to March 2001. Table 3.2 sum­
marizes the variables used for the empirical analysis.
Table 3.2: Data Description
Variable Notation Data variable Source
Bank Deposits dt Demand Deposits IFS
Bank Credit Lt Domestic Credit IFS
Domestic Interest rate it Monthly average call money rates 
of major commercial banks
RBI
World Interest rate n US Federal Funds Rate US Fed. Reserve 
System
Deposit rate * Bank rate IFS
Lending Rate 4 Commercial lending rate- Prime IFS
Output Vt Index of Industrial Production (IIP) RBI
Inflation Change in Wholesale Price Index RBI
RBI:Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy 
IFS: International Finance Statistics
16Output has been used because of lack of availability of monthly data on other variables. However, 
as long the impact of shock on the spreads and output is in accordance with the theoretical setup, the 
whole transmission mechanism is justified. Although VAR incorporates all the “driving” variables in 
the theoretical model, it can be argued that the omitted variable bias may result in contemporaneous 
correlation between the error terms of the system. Hence the correlation in VAR is tested for, using the 
Lagrange Multiplier test and it is found that null of no autocorrelation between the residuals could not be 
rejected.
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It is to be noted that the call money rate of major commercial banks and the Index of 
Industrial Production (IIP) has been taken as a proxy for the domestic nominal interest 
rate and output respectively.17 The basic summary statistics of the variables is given in 
Table 3.3:
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics
Variable Notation Min. Max. Mean St. deviation Units
Bank Deposits dt 361.52 1310.88 751.76 251.69 Rs. Billion
Bank Credit Lt 3126.67 9942.23 5765.13 1923.43 Rs. Billion
Domestic Interest rate it 1.22 35.29 10.94 6.63 % per annum
Foreign Interest rate rt 2.92 6.05 4.79 1.00 % per annum
Deposit rate 4 8.00 12.00 10.93 1.51 % per annum
Lending Rate 4 12.00 20.00 15.34 2.16 % per annum
Output yt 84.62 174.50 121.31 23.44 Index
Wholesale Price Index WPI 77.92 149.50 117.47 20.70 Index
It is imperative to test the series for stationarity as it is a prerequisite to the VAR analysis 
(Hamilton, 1994). Stationary tests make it possible to discover whether the VAR model 
should be formulated in levels or first differences.
U nit R oot Tests
The Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test of stationarity is performed on all the variables. 
The lag length is selected for the ADF tests using the general to specific approach suggested 
by Perron (1989).18 The following table presents the results for the unit root tests:
17It is a standard practice in the literature to use the money market rate as a proxy for domestic interest 
rate. (For example see Garretsen and Swank, 1998).
18Hall (1994) suggests that for moderate to large samples a general-to-specific approach performs better 
than standard information criteria such as those due to Hannan, Quinn and Akaike and Schwartz. Ng 
and Perron (1995) further confirm the approach using t or F test for the significance of lags is superior to 
information based rules because of more robust size properties across models. Therefore, the general to 
specific approach adopted by Perron (1989) is used. In accordance with this a large value of k(= 8) is used 
to begin and continually reduced until the t-value (calculated from ADF test) on fi(k) is greater than 1.6 
in absolute value and that of fi(l) is less than 1.6 for l > k.
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Table 3.4: Augmented Dickey Puller Unit Root Tests
Variable ADF stats Lags Trend/No trend Series
Credit 0.54 8 Trend i(i)
Deposit -1.53 8 Trend i(i)
Deposit/credit -2.49 0 i(i)
Lending rate -1.03 8 i(i)
Deposit Rate 0.22 7 i(i)
Domestic Interest Rate —2.9* 3 1(0)
Lending Spread -2.01 0 1(1)
Deposit Spread -5.30* 0 1(0)
World Interest Rate -3.51* 6 1(0)
WPI -2.07 5 Trend 1(1)
Inflation -4.86* 6 1(0)
Output(IIP) -0.07 8 1(1)
*: Significant at 1% level.
The results imply there is a mixture of stationary (1(0)) and non stationary series (1(1)): 
The null hypothesis of unit root cannot be rejected for credit, deposit, deposit to credit 
ratio, lending rate, deposit rate and lending spread. On the other hand, domestic interest 
rate, deposit spread and world interest rate are stationary at levels. In order to implement 
a VAR all the variables have to be made stationary. The series is made stationary using 
the Baxter-King filter. This filter converts the series into its cyclical components, retaining 
the original properties of the series and keeping the timing relationships between the series 
unaltered (Baxter and King, 1995).19 The following figures plot the actual and filtered 
data series for all the variables used in the VAR analysis.
19The Baxter-King filter is an improvement on the Hodrick-Prescott filter. As Baxter and King (1995, 
page 18) conclude : “....our high-pass filter is better in two dimensions: its ease of application to data 
sampled at frequencies other than quarterly, and its appropriate treatment of observations near the end­
points of the sample. ” The actual technique of the Baxter-King filter is discussed in Appendix B.
Ln
 re
<
CHAPTER 3. FISCAL DEFICIT AND BANKING CRISES 69
IIP (1990M5:2001M3) 
Filtered
Months
Figure 3.1: Index of Industrial Production
Lending Spread (1990M5:2001 M3) 
Filtered
Months
Figure 3.2: Lending Spread
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Deposit Spread (1990M5:2001M3) 
Filtered
Months
Figure 3.3: Deposit Spread
US interest rate (1990M5:2001M3) 
Filtered
Months
Figure 3.4: US Federal Funds rate
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Domestic interest rate (1990M5:2001M3)
Filtered
Months
Figure 3.5: Domestic Interest Rate
Deposit credit ratio (1990M5:2001M3)
Filtered
Months
Figure 3.6: Deposit to Credit Ratio
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3.4.3 R ed u ced  Form  V A R
A reduced form VAR framework is used for the analysis. A reduced form VAR expresses 
each variable as a linear function of its own past values, the past values of all other variables 
being considered and a serially uncorrelated error term (Stock and Watson, 2001). Thus 
there are five equations in the VAR: current output as a function of past values of lending 
spread, deposit spread, interest rate and deposit to credit ratio; Current lending spread as 
a function of past values of deposit spread, interest rate, output and deposit to credit ratio; 
and similarly for the interest rate, deposit spread and deposit to credit ratio equations.
The number of lagged values in each equation is determined by the Akaike Information 
Criteria (AIC) which is the preferred method for lag length selection when monthly data 
is used for the VAR analysis (Ivanov and Kilian, 2003). Six lags are used in the VAR. The 
VAR model can be specified as:
6
(3.31)
where
Vt
i t
Zt ~ (4 -  i dt ) t
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Z t - i
y t - i
L —i
(h -  it)t-i 
. (*)*-< .
f t  —
e it
^4t
a  is the vector of intercepts and ß\ the coefficient vector. The literature ((Lutkepohl, 
1993),(Stock and Watson, 2001)) argues that VAR and impulse responses give meaningful 
interpretation under the following assumptions:
• E(et ) = 0
• E(et et ) =  El for all t, where El =  cry,i, j  =  1,2, ....5 is a positive definite matrix
•  No Autocorrelation between residuals of VAR models: E(etet ) =  0 for all t =  t ' . 
The Lagrange Multiplier LM test for autocorrelation in residuals for VAR models 
suggested in Johansen (1995) can be applied to test this assumption.
• Stability of VAR: All the roots of the equation |I5— ßiz*\ = 0 outside the unit 
circle. This assumption can be tested by checking absolute values of the eigenvalues 
which should be less than one.
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The above assumptions are satisfied in the VAR framework. The null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation between the residuals could not be rejected (x2(16) =  18.75, P value is 
0.28). The stability condition of VAR is also satisfied as all the eigenvalues lie inside the 
unit circle. The purpose of the VAR analysis is to find the impact of a one period shock 
in the domestic interest rate to all the other variables in the system. Impulse Response 
Functions (IRF’s) are now discussed.
Im pulse R esponse Functions
The IR F’s for the model are now derived. Eq. (3.31) can be re-written using lag operator 
as:
Zt =  ca +  S(L)Zt +  Ct 
or
[I-<S(L)]Zt =  a  +  et
Given tha t the stability condition is satisfied, gives:
Z =  [ I - A ( L ) } - \ a  + et)
oo
i = 0 
oo
— d  +  A let - i
i = 0
= Oc + Ct + A 6 t - i  + A 2 C t - i  + • • •
The coefficients of the e terms are the impulse response functions for Zt when e is shocked. 
Generally it is a standard practise in the literature to choose a finite time horizon and
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plot these coefficients. The plot traces the effect on the variables of one time innovation in 
the system. The GIRFs suggested by Pesaran (1997) are used which are invariant of the 
ordering of the variables in the VAR model. Figures 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 present the impulse 
responses of output, deposit to credit ratio and lending spread respectively, to a one period 
shock in the domestic interest rate for a five month horizon. The interest is in the initial 
responses of the variables as that can be directly compared to the theoretical evidence from 
our model.20 The impulse responses are each normalized to begin at zero. The bold line 
indicates the mean response and the 95 per cent confidence intervals of these responses are 
also indicated by broken lines.
Output
Lower Bound(95% Cl) 
Upper Bound(95% Cl)
Months
Figure 3.7: GIRF: Output
20This is essentially because model is static.
CHAPTER 3. FISCAL DEFICIT AND BANKING CRISES 76
Deposit-Credit Ratio 
Lower Bound(95% Cl) 
Upper Bound(95% Cl)
Months
Figure 3.8: GIRF: Deposit-Credit Ratio
Lending Spread 
Lower Bound(95% Cl) 
Upper Bound(95% Cl)
Months
Figure 3.9: GIRF: Lending Spread
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As predicted by the model there is a decline in output. Output falls by 0.3 per cent of its 
value in the first month. The lending spread rises by around 3 per cent with a one period 
shock in the interest rate. This is also in accordance with the theoretical prediction of the 
model. The demand to credit ratio increases in the first two months in accordance to the 
model and then declines for two periods after which it rises again. The subsequent dynamic 
behavior as shown in these graphs is less significant since the model is static. Further the 
confidence bands widen considerably with time indicating towards insignificant trends in 
the long run. Such behavior is common in this literature, e.g. see IRF’s reported by 
Edwards and Vegh (1997).
3.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has developed a general equilibrium model to investigate the transmission and 
impact of stabilization efforts and the possibility of policy reversal in developing economies. 
The main highlights of the model are the presence of government guarantees to banks, 
imperfect capital mobility, exchange rate uncertainty, and transaction costs incurred by 
the banking sector. The interaction of all four sectors of the model: Household, banks, 
government and firms has been established and the impact of transmission of shocks is 
determined theoretically. It has been argued that under the assumptions of the model, there 
exists an offsetting effect with each stabilization effort of the government. In particular 
this offsetting effect is endogenously determined and in the current model quantifies the 
government guarantees. In actuality, the government guarantees are significantly high for 
developing economies.21 The model is then tested empirically using Indian data. A reduced 
form VAR methodology and impulse response functions are used to determine the impact
21 According to Bhattacharya and Patel (2003) the government guarantees are estimated to be 12 per 
cent of GDP for India.
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of exogenous shocks on major endogenous variables of the model. The empirical evidence 
is broadly consistent with the theoretical model.
As mentioned earlier the model is predicated on two critical empirical assumptions: (i) 
that government satisfies an intertemporal budget constraint, and (ii) that banks affect 
the credit transmission mechanism. In chapters 4 and 5, the veracity of these assumptions 
is established.
Chapter 4
Structural Breaks, Unit Roots and
Cointegration: An Analysis of the 
Sustainability of the Fiscal Deficit of 
Center and State Governments in India
4.1 In trodu ction
Rapid accumulation of domestic debt can lead to severe macroeconomic problems, and 
impede control of the fiscal deficit itself. This is particularly relevant for developing coun­
tries where the need for public expenditure is high and tax systems, public regulation and 
accountability are weak. For example, the combined gross fiscal deficit of the central and 
state governments in India overshot its budgeted target by one per cent in 2002-03 (RBI, 
2003a). The tax-GDP ratio is also showing a downward trend and has fallen by 2 per cent 
of GDP from the late 1980’s to 2001-02 year. Given recent experience in India, a number 
of commentators have expressed concern over the government’s deficit and mounting debt. 
Solvency conditions appear to be violated in the Indian case ((Buiter and Patel, 1992),
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(Buiter and Patel, 1995) and (Jha, 1999)) and there is fear that, with existing trends, the 
public sector may become bankrupt in the long run.
Despite recent adverse trends the Indian government has strengthened its commitment 
towards sound fiscal management, making distinct gains in expenditure management by 
reducing current spending. The state governments were also able to contain revenue expen­
diture at the budgeted level. The central government’s resolve towards fiscal adjustment 
is further evident from the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Bill (FRBMB) 
introduced in Parliament in December 2000. The bill is aimed at eliminating the govern­
ment revenue deficit1 over the next five years and cutting the fiscal deficit to two percent 
of GDP. The combined fiscal deficit of state and central governments in India has shown 
a declining trend2 in the 1990’s but remains at high levels in the range of 5 to 5.5 per cent 
of GDP. The recent high deficits can be attributed to an economic slowdown causing a 
fall in tax revenues, restructuring of the financial sector as part of wider economic reforms 
which forces the adoption of measures like recapitalization of public sector banks,3 as well 
as some exogenous factors like severe drought which leads to a rise in food subsidies.
Since the solvency tests involve analysis of time series properties of revenue and expenditure 
series, the present chapter argues for the debate on debt sustainability to be examined in 
the light of recent advances on endogenous structural breaks in case of unit root analysis 
and cointegration since revenue and expenditure series are susceptible to structural breaks 
in response to sharp economic shocks. These shocks may be external shocks like the Indo- 
China or Indo-Pak war, or oil price shocks like those in the 1970’s, or domestic shocks 
arising from government policies, like the financial restructuring of the mid 1980’s, or the 
initiation of the liberalization process in 1993. It is discovered that structural breaks or
1 Revenue deficit is the difference between revenue expenditure and revenue receipts.
2The average growth of combined gross fiscal deficit in 1990’s was 15 per cent compared to 18 per cent 
in the 1980’s.
3As discussed in chapter 2, the government is spending around 0.7 per cent of GDP every year on 
cleaning up the balance sheets of PSBs in order to make them attractive for private sector investment.
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regime shifts play a crucial role in time series analysis of revenue and expenditure series. 
Once the structural breaks are accounted for in the analysis the series are indeed found 
to be trend-stationary. The results question the robustness of earlier studies’ results and 
pose the possibility that the debt in the Indian case may not be unsustainable.
The plan of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 develops the intertemporal government 
budget constraint; Section 3 details the data used in this chapter; section 4 tests the unit 
root properties of the revenue and expenditure series allowing for endogenous structural 
breaks as suggested by Zivot and Andrews (1992) and Lumsdaine and Papell (1997); while 
section 5 concludes.
This chapter makes two contributions - (i) it provides a basis for testing for debt sustain­
ability even in the absence of data on debt; (ii) it provides a methodology for inducting 
unknown structural breaks in the analysis of the sustainability of public debt at both the 
unit root testing and cointegration stages.4 In the particular case of India, it is discovered 
that the debt is not unsustainable which is in sharp contrast to the widely prevalent view 
in extant literature and policy discussions. The analysis here also confirms the solvency of 
intertemporal budget constraint in the theoretical model used in chapter 3.
4The structural break analysis at cointegration stage is not directly applicable to the data used and 
hence is discussed in Appendix C.
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4.2 Sustainability of the Domestic Fiscal Debt
T he Governm ent Intertem poral Budget Constraint
In this section the simple analytics of sustainability for domestic deficit are developed.5 
The most straightforward way to assess the sustainability of a public debt situation is to 
start from the governmental intertemporal budget constraint. This is written in nominal 
terms as:
G t- T t  + i l B t - ^ B t - B t ^  (4.1)
where Gt is the value of government expenditure (purchase of goods and services plus 
transfer payments); Bt the government debt at the end of period £, Tt government tax 
revenue and if the one-period rate of interest payable on government debt. Eq. (4.1) states 
tha t in the absence of money finance, the government budget deficit must be financed by 
new debt creation. Hence, expressing Eq. (4.1) in terms of ratios to GDP gives:
bt = (1 +  if)(l +  Th + iit) lbt~i +  (gt — Tt) (4-2)
where the lower case letters denote the ratio of the corresponding uppercase variables 
to nominal GDP: bt =  Bt/PtYt\ 9t =  Gt/PtYt; Tt = Tt/P tYt ; with P and Y  being the 
price level and real GDP respectively. 7rt =  (Pt — Pt-i) /P t-i  is the rate of inflation and 
r]t = (Yt — Yt_\)/Y t- \  the rate of growth of real GDP. The derivation of Eq. (4.2) has used 
the relationship that:
PtYt — (1 T- tt*)(1 +  r)t)Pt-\Yt-\ ~  (1 +  tt* +  r)t)Pt-\Yt-\
(gt — Tt ) is the primary deficit expressed as a percentage of GDP. We have the following 
cases:
Case 1: if — 7rt < r]t
5This section heavily draws from Jha and Sharma (2004).
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In this case in Eq. (4.2) the debt ratio will stabilize and the economy will remain solvent 
if: lim^oo E(bt) =  0
If the initial debt to GDP ratio (60) is strictly positive, this requires two conditions: z?—7T* < 
Tjt for all t so that the debt ratio stabilizes rather than explodes. This is the so- called 
sustainability condition and makes any stable path of the primary deficit consistent with 
a stable public debt to GDP ratio. In addition there is condition (b) that gt — rt < 0 on 
average, if not in every period, so that the debt burden is ultimately liquidated.
These two conditions are necessary and sufficient and ensure that, no matter how large 
the debt, it can be paid off through tax increases, expenditure cuts or inflation. Thus the 
government is solvent. The steady state (finite) value of the debt-GDP ratio is:
b = bt = bt- 1 =  (1 +  7] +  7r) (77 -  (r -  7T))~ \g  -  r)  i f  r -  ir < 77 (4.3)
Eq. (4.3) emphasizes a strong link between government indebtedness and its primary 
deficit.
Case 2: i9t — Trt > r]t
In this case the debt is unsustainable and the debt stock will become infinite no matter 
what sequence of primary deficits are chosen, unless the debt stock itself can be offset 
by matching the sequence of increasing but discounted primary surplus in the future. To 
consider sustainability further here Eq. (4.2) is transformed to get:
W — (1 +  <Pt)bt- 1 +  (9 t ~  Tt) (4.4)
where the fact:
(1 -f i9)(1 + 71* +  gt)~l = 1 + if  — fl* — rjt has been used. ipt =  i9 — TTt — Vt is the real interest 
rate minus the rate of growth of real GDP. Eq. (4.4) will always hold ex post. Looking
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forward the identity can be written in Eq. (4.4) for time period t + 1 as:
bt = Et[(l + (pt) 1bt+1 — (gt+i — Tt+i)} (4.5)
where bt is known in period t. For this one period constraint to hold in expectational terms, 
it must equal the expected discounted net debt-to-GDP ratio in period t + 1 conditional 
on information at time t. For fiscal policy to be sustainable for one time period Eq. (4.5) 
must hold. Writing the budget constraint of Eq. (4.5) for subsequent time periods t + 2, 
t + 3 etc. and solving forward gives:
oo s s
bt = Et PJ(1 + tpt+i) \ r t+s — gt+s) + Et ]̂ J(1 + <Pt+i) 1bt+s ( 4 - 6 )
s= 0  i = l  i = l
It is apparent that IIi= i(l +  is a time-varying real discount factor adjusted for
growth of real GDP with </? > 0. A necessary and sufficient condition for sustainability is 
that as s — * oo the discounted value of the expected debt-to-GDP ratio converges to zero. 
This is a transversality condition and can be expressed as:
s
h j ^  E t J J ( 1  +  </?t+i) 1bt+s =  0  ( 4 - 7 )
t= l
Eq. (4.7) implies that a government is solvent if the transversality condition guarantees 
the non- explosiveness of public debt and when no Ponzi games are allowed, i.e., no new 
debt is issued by the government to meet interest payments. Hence it follows that current 
debt is offset by the sum of the current and expected future discounted surpluses, implying 
that the budget constraint holds in present value terms with:
oo s
bt =  hm Et ^ 2  JJ(1 +  <£t+i)-1(Tt+s -  gt+s)
s= 0  t= l
(4.8)
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The Critical Value of Debt-GDP Ratio
Given Eq. (4.8) and using zm — Tmax — gmin as a definition of the maximum level of 
the government’s primary surplus the critical value of the public debt ratio (bc ) can be 
determined, which will satisfy the sustainability condition:
bt <bc = zm{r -  7T -  77 ) ' 1 (4.9)
The necessary primary surplus can also be determined, given the initial debt ratio, 6 0, the 
real interest rate and the growth rate of real GDP, to stabilize future debt to GDP ratio, 
when r — 7T > rj. Eq. (4.2) can be used to define the finite value (fe0) to which b converges 
as:
z** = (r — 7T — 77) (1 +  77 +  7r)_16o (4-10)
The gap between the stabilizing primary surplus (z**) and the actual primary surplus 
(Tt ~  9t) may be used as a sustainability indicator. This indicator gives the magnitude by 
which either revenue must be increased or expenditure cut relative to income to stop the 
debt ratio from growing.
Thus the sustainability of public debt is essentially an intertemporal question. In partic­
ular, every temporary deficit can be sustainable so long as it is matched by an adequate 
future surplus. Most empirical tests on sustainability apply time series methods and ask 
whether the observed characteristics of debt-related variables satisfy the solvency condition 
in Eq. (4.7). This solvency condition can be tested in a variety of ways depending on the 
processes postulated for the primary deficit (gt — rt) and the real interest rate adjusted for 
output growth ((ft). Hamilton and Flavin (1986) and Trehan and Walsh (1991), among 
others, examine the case where (gt — rt) is strictly exogenous and ipt is constant. Wilcox 
(1989) considers the case with exogenous (gt — rt) but variable (pt. Uctum and Wickens
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(1997) consider the case where ipt is stochastic and (gt — rt) could be exogenous or en­
dogenous. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the real interest rate adjusted for 
output growth, tpu is constant with an unconditional mean. To proceed further now take 
the first difference of Eq. (4.6), substitute for Abt using Eq. (4.4) and simplify to get:
where Abt = gt +  cpbt - 1  -  rt = pt -  n  with pt = gt +  pbt - 1
is defined as total government expenditure inclusive of expenditure on goods and services, 
transfer payments and interest on debt. If the government satisfies its intertemporal budget 
constraint the expected limit term in Eq. (4.11) is zero so that the sum of the current 
budget surplus (rt — pt) and the expected present discounted value of the future surplus 
will equal the amount needed to repay the principal and interest on the initial debt. When 
this condition holds, it can be said that the current expected paths of government spending 
and taxation are sustainable.
As Papadopoulos and Sidiropoulos (1999) demonstrate, if the limit terms on the right- 
hand-side of Eq. (4.11) are zero, then a certain cointegrating relationship emerges. Hence 
cointegration is a necessary condition for the intertemporal budget constraint to hold. To 
see this assume that dt+a and rt+8 follow random walks with drift, i.e., these variables 
follow the following time series processes:
oo
Abt — Pt — R — y~](l + p) s 1Et(ATt+s — Adt+s) +  lim (1 +  ip)L ' s— ►oo
-  lim (1 +  ip) s 1Et-ib t+a- i
s —►OO
(4.11)
A pt — ocd +  Vd,t+s (4.12)
Art =  a .  + ,(+. (4.13)
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where ad and aT are constants and vd and vT are zero-mean stationary processes. Hence 
Eq. (4.11) can be rewritten as:
pt - T t = a + lim (1 +  Etbt+S -  lim (1 4- p)~s~l Et-ibt+s-\ +  vt (4.14)
S —> 0 0  8 —*  OO
with
=  E S = o (! +  V y s ~ \ a d  -  a T )
" t  =  E ^ o C 1 +  V)"*‘ 1(^ ,t+ . ~  V r,t+ s)
Given that pt and rt are 1(1) and given that equations (4.12) and (4.13) imply stationarity 
on the right hand side of Eq. (4.11), the left hand side of Eq. (4.11) must also be stationary 
for which a necessary condition is that Eq. (4.14) be stationary, which will be the case 
when pt and rt are cointegrated.
Thus a test for sustainability of the debt would check for the cointegration of these two 
variables if they are 7(1). This cointegrating regression would take the form:
Tt = a + ßpt + vt (4-15)
Formally, then, if pt and rf are 7(1), the null hypothesis is that pt and rt are cointegrated 
and that ß = 1. If this null hypothesis is not rejected the public debt is sustainable. Thus 
understanding the time series properties of the revenue and expenditure series would be 
crucial to establishing the sustainability or otherwise of the public debt. This chapter 
focuses on this issue. Of particular interest is the possibility that the data might actually 
be 7(0) with one or more structural breaks whereas standard unit root tests could be 
rejecting the null of unit roots.
A structural break is said to have taken place when a change is observed in the regression 
parameters of the model. Several studies have reported instances where a series which
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was classified as non-stationary (i.e., 1(1)) in the absence of structural break hypothesis 
was actually trend stationary once structural break was accounted for in the analysis. 
Thus the conventional unit root tests erroneously fail to reject the null of unit root for 
the series. Structural breaks are a result of some event significantly affecting the variables 
being studied. Such breaks can lead to a permanent shift in the level or slope (or both) 
of the series but the basic nature of the series remains unchanged. With such events or 
shocks accounted for, the series can be trend stationary but with a structural break. More 
recent literature admits the possibility of more than one such structural break.
The purpose of this chapter is to ascertain whether the combined public debt of the Indian 
central and state governments is sustainable when the possibility of endogenous structural 
breaks is allowed for. Buiter and Patel (1992) and Buffer and Patel (1995) base their test on 
the unit root properties of the public debt series whereas Jha (1999) uses the cointegration 
approach but does not permit structural breaks.
4.3 Fiscal Sustainability with structural breaks
Conventional time series analysis has worked with structural breaks but the literature on 
structural break hypothesis in the context of unit root testing is sparse. A brief review of 
this literature follows.
Several studies have reported cases where a series which was classified as non-st ationary 
(i.e., 7(1)) in the absence of structural break hypothesis was actually trend stationary once 
a structural break was allowed for in the analysis. This means the conventional unit root 
tests falsely fail to reject the null of unit root for the series which are stationary with 
structural breaks. The argument given is that structural breaks which are a result of some 
event significantly affecting the macroeconomic variables, can lead to a permanent shift in
CHAPTER 4. FISCAL DEFICIT SUSTAINABILITY IN INDIA 89
the level or slope (or both) of the series but that the basic nature of the series remains 
unchanged. Thus, once these events or shocks are allowed for the series then can be trend 
stationary but with a structural break. The importance of the structural break hypothesis 
is evident from the fact that ignorance of the structural break can result in incorrect 
inferences from the model. For example the inferences drawn from the techniques like co­
integration and error correction modeling (which are applicable to non-stationary series) 
would be redundant if the underlying series is actually stationary with structural breaks.
The recent debate in the structural break literature was initiated by Nelson and Plosser 
(1982) who analyzed historic time series data over a very long period with the objective 
of fitting an appropriate model for each time series under consideration. This empirical 
characterization led to the conclusion that most of the macroeconomic series under consid­
eration displayed non-stationary process with no tendency of returning to a deterministic 
path. This result was crucial as it was contrary to the traditional view prevailing in the 
then literature that macroeconomic time series display stationary fluctuations around a 
deterministic trend. Nelson and Plosser opined that shocks have a permanent effect on 
the long run level of the macroeconomic series. This challenged the prevailing view which 
held that external shocks subside after a period of time and in the long run have minimal 
effects leaving the basic nature of the series remaining the same.
Perron (1989) re investigated the same set of series as those considered by Nelson and 
Plosser and carried out the analysis after allowing for structural break. Perron assumed 
the structural break to be determined exogenously. The possibility of structural break was 
checked by considering three models. The first allowed for a one point change (i.e.,single 
break) in the intercept, the second model allowed for the one point change to have taken 
place in the slope coefficient and the third model considered both effects to have taken 
place i.e., one point change in the intercept as well as in the slope. Perron (1989) opines
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that the conventional unit root test mostly fails to reject the unit root hypothesis even for 
the series which were known to be trend stationary with structural break.6 The author 
goes on to suggest a modified version of the conventional ADF test which he uses in his 
analysis.
Perron’s (Perron, 1989) test rejected unit root hypothesis for all but three series i.e., except 
for three series all of the remaining series under consideration were found to be stationary 
with a structural break. These results almost reversed the Nelson and Plosser (1982) 
findings. Thus Perron (1989) was a crucial landmark in the structural break debate. 
However this analysis was subject to the criticism that structural breaks chosen were 
arbitrary. It was argued that selection of pretest exogenous break, as done by Perron, 
involves subjectivity.
In criticizing Perron, Zivot and Andrews (1992) tried to tackle the problem by endogenis- 
ing the date of structural break i.e., considering the date of the break to be determined 
endogenously within the model. The testing procedure adopted by Zivot and Andrews 
(1992) involved estimation of the date of the structural break by using sequential methods. 
The results obtained were observed to have partially reversed Perron’s results. Zivot and 
Andrews failed to reject the unit root null for four of the series. Thus four series which were 
declared to be 1(0) using Perron’s test actually had unit roots. As the empirical exercise 
in the present thesis closely follows the technique used by Zivot and Andrews (1992), a 
detailed discussion of the technique is provided in section 4.5.
6This assertion is based on some Monte Carlo studies carried out by Perron (1989).
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4.4 Data
The empirical analysis is done by combining the revenue and expenditure of the central and 
state governments of India. The revenue and expenditure data series (1951-2000) is taken 
from various issues of the Budget documents of Government of India and the Handbook 
of statistics on the Indian Economy published by RBI (RBI, 2003e). The analysis is done 
using data in real and nominal magnitudes. The real series is calculated by deflating the 
nominal data using the CPI based inflation rate. A quick look at the data from figures 4.1, 
4.2 and 4.3 reveals there is a sharp variation in the revenue and expenditure series over 
time during the period of analysis.7
7Please note 1 crore =  10 million.
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Figure 4.1: Combined revenue and expenditure for central and state governments: Real 
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Figure 4.2: Combined revenue and expenditure for central and state governments: Nominal 
Magnitudes (1951-2000)
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4.5 M ethodology
The methodology considers one break analysis initially and then extends it by incorporating 
an additional break. Due to the constraint of sample size, the analysis for more than two 
structural breaks is beyond the scope of this study. The estimation of break dates is a 
prerequisite for the analysis. To do so the following null hypothesis is considered:
Rt = ot + Rt-i + £t (4.16)
where Rt is the combined revenue of central and state governments.
In words this equation means that the series is difference stationary i.e., integrated of 
order one. The alternative hypothesis is the case where the series is subject to fit some 
trend stationary process in the presence of an endogenous structural break. The model 
specification allows for a change in both the level and the slope of the series. The estimation 
of the break date is followed by testing for the null hypothesis. The test cannot use the 
standard ADF critical values or the standard normal distributions due to the small sample 
bias in the asymptotic distribution of the test statistics (Zivot and Andrews, 1992). In 
the present study the one break analysis closely follows the technique used by Zivot and 
Andrews (1992) for one structural break. The following subsection briefly discusses this 
methodology and specification of this model.
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4.5 .1  One Break M odel
M odel Specification
The model considered is :
k
A Rt = a  +  ßt + 'yDIlt +  u D S l t +  ßRt-i  +  ^  CiARt-i +  et (4.17)
2=1
for t = 1 .......T, where c(L) is a lag polynomial of known order k and 1 — c(L)L has all its
unit root outside the unit circle.
D I l t is the indicator dummy variable for a mean shift occurring at time SB1 and DSlt  is 
the corresponding trend shift variable.
D I l t =  1 if (t > SB1)
D S l t = (t -  SB1) if (t < SB1)
The k extra regressors are taken in order to take care of the autocorrelation i.e the tem­
poral dependence in the error terms. The test for unit root hypothesis is under the null of 
li = 0. Hence the hypothesis to test for unit root are:
Null Hypothesis H0 : Series is 7(1)
Alternative Hypothesis Ha ‘ Series is trend stationary with one structural break 
The model allows for changes in both the slope and trend coefficients.
Em pirical Analysis
The lag value k can be selected by two possible strategies discussed in the literature. One 
is to set the value of k (exogenously), to a fairly large value,8 such that the true value is 
less than the chosen value k. Another method to choose k is to endogenize the value of k
8This is done in order to be on the safer side.
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i.e., the lag value is data dependent in this case.9 There are several methods of selecting 
the data based lag value of k, namely Hannan and Quinn’s information criteria, Akaike’s 
Information criteria and Schwarz’s information criteria. Apart from these, an approach 
known as the general to specific approach is also used to find the optimal lag length k. 
However, according to Hall (1994) the estimation of k can affect the distribution of the ADF 
test which is used for unit root testing. On analyzing the distortions in the distribution of 
ADF statistics Hall (1994) concludes that for moderate to large sample sizes the general- 
to-specific approach performs better than various information criteria. Hence, the present 
study uses the well known Perron (1989) criteria, based on the general to specific approach. 
As per this criteria, first a maximum value of k is set to some k* and then k is narrowed 
down (here k* is set at 8 and thereafter the first value of k is chosen such that the t-stats 
(calculated from ADF test) on fik is greater than 1.6 in absolute value and that of ßi is 
less than 1.6 for / > k). Table 4.1 summarizes the lag values calculated (i.e., value of k) 
for each of the series.
Table 4.1: Lag length k
Nominal Magnitudes
Revenue 8
Expenditure 8
Real magnitudes 
Revenue 8
Expenditure 8
The technique allows the structural break to vary between 2 and T  — 1 where T is the 
sample size. This means the series is trimmed from the edge as this technique does not 
allow for structural break at the beginning or the end of the series. Having trimmed the
data a dummy variable is assigned for each value of T  varying between 2 and T — 1. Hence
9This method is more popularly used than the previous one, the reason being that unlike the previous 
method this does not involve any subjectivity.
CHAPTER 4. FISCAL DEFICIT SUSTAINABILITY IN INDIA 98
giving T — 2 combinations of the data set.
The next step is to estimate the unknown break point. The criteria for choosing this is 
to take the break point supporting the alternative hypothesis the most (i.e. supports the 
null hypothesis the least). This is implemented practically as follows: Firstly, a sequential 
OLS procedure is run to test for the coefficient of Rt-i i.e., /i =  0 over these data sets to 
get the T  — 2 t-s ta ts 't ' attached with the corresponding coefficients. It is to be noted that 
‘t '  is a function of T. Now to decide the date of the structural break, SB1, the minimum 
value is chosen of one sided (left tailed to be more precise) ‘t '  statistic calculated above, 
the date corresponding to this t-stats is the estimated date of the structural break. Thus, 
the date of the structural break is: 
t(SBl) = minTi £M(T;)
The minimum of all the T — 2 t-stats is taken the Tj selected corresponding to that t-stats. 
This gives date of the structural break SB  1.
Critical Values
It should be noted here that the asymptotic distribution of the t-stats computed above is
not the standard distribution and hence the test of significance can not be done using the
standard t-statistics. Hence one has to generate the finite sample critical values. Zivot and
Andrews (1992) report the sample specific asymptotic critical values for the above model.
However asymptotic critical values are less than the finite sample critical values and are
conclusive for the analysis only if the computed t-statistics are less than these values.10 For
the scenario in which computed t-stats are higher that the asymptotic critical values, there
are two possibilities: The coefficient is significant or the value of the computed statistics
lies between the asymptotic critical value and the finite sample critical value and thus the
10This will mean the coefficients are insignificant and will remain so even if the finite sample critical 
values are used.
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coefficient is insignificant. Hence it is necessary to compare the statistics with the finite 
sample critical values. Vogelsang and Perron (1998, Page 1082) report the finite sample 
(for sample size 50) critical values for the model specification used here. The same is used 
for this analysis for testing the significance of /r. Table 4.2 presents the results for one 
break model.
Table 4.2: Tests for Unit Roots: Combined revenue and expenditure for central and state 
governments, One Break
Series SB  1 7 (jJ P
Nominal Magnitude
Revenue 1961 0.144 0.024 -0.591
(-3.32) (2.32) (-4.76)
Expenditure 1975 -0.081 -0.006 -1.24
(-2.16) (-1.85) (—5.91*)
Real Magnitude
Revenue 1962 0.167 -0.053 -1.1
(2.39) (-2.71) (-5.49)
Expenditure 1961 0.27 0.038 -0.851
(3.19) (-0.693) (-5.93*)
t-statistic are in parentheses.
*: Significant at 5% level.
Critical values of Vogelsang and Perron (1998) for T  — 50 are -6.29 (at 1%) and -5.59 (at 5%).
The above results show that the null of unit root could not be rejected for the revenue 
series (both real and nominal magnitudes). However the unit root null is rejected for the 
expenditure series and hence it can be argued that the expenditure series is trend stationary 
with one structural break.
In the recent literature of structural breaks, Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) suggest a null of 
unit root which is accepted in the analysis considering a one break model may be rejected 
if the analysis is repeated with one additional endogenous structural break i.e., the model 
is specified so els to incorporate two structural breaks. The inferences by Lumsdaine and
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Papell (1997) motivates a further extension of present analysis to allow for two structural 
breaks in the series to check whether any additional information is revealed about the 
nature of the series. The following subsection discusses the two break model given by 
Lumsdaine and Papell (1997).
4.5.2 Two Break M odel
The technique used in the two break model was given by Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) 
and is based on sequential test procedures given by Banerjee et al. (1992). Although this 
technique is similar to that of Zivot and Andrews (1992), the analysis is done considering 
two breaks instead of one.
Theory and M odel Specification
The model considered in the case of two structural breaks is :
k
ARt = a 4- ßt 4- j D I L +  ujDSlt T xpDI2t +  QDS2t +  fj,Rt—i -4- ^   ̂ +  €t (4.18)
i=l
for t = 1 .......T, where c(L) is a lag polynomial of known order k and 1 — c(L)L has all its
roots lying outside the unit circle.
D I l t and DI2t are indicator dummy variables for a mean shift occurring at times SB  1 and 
S B 2, respectively and D S l t and DS2t are the corresponding trend shift variables, such 
that:
D I l t =  1 if (t > SB1)
DI2t =  1 if (t > SB2)
D S l t = { t -  SB l)  if (t < SB1)
DS2t = ( t -  SB2) if {t < SB2)
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The test for unit root is under the null hypothesis of // =  0. Hence 
Null Hypothesis H0 : Series is 1(1)
Alternative Hypothesis Ha '■ Series is trend stationary with two structural breaks
The model allows for the changes in both the slope and trend coefficients in both SB  1 and
SB2.
Empirical Analysis
Although, the basic intuition here is exactly the same as in the one break model, it is 
imperative to take account of several noteworthy points owing to the incorporation of one 
additional break S B 2.
The possibility of two consecutive structural breaks is ruled out i.e, SB  1 ^  SB2 ±1 and 
SB  1 =£ S B 2. Hence a positive shock followed by a negative shock or vice versa is not 
considered by the technique.
In accordance with the underlying theory of the technique used, the test for the change in 
coefficients is not considered at the ends of the sample. This means that SB  1 and SB2 
are allowed to vary between 2 and T  — 1 only. This requires trimming of data at the edges.
The unknown S B  1 and SB2 are calculated from the minimum of the sequence of t-stats 
computed over a two dimensional matrix of the possible combinations of ki and &2 - The 
set corresponding to minimum t-stats gives the point of structural breaks SB  1 and S B 2.
The lag length k is estimated within the model using the Perron criteria as done in the 
one break analysis of the previous section.
Critical values reported by Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) have been used for testing the
CHAPTER 4. FISCAL DEFICIT SUSTAINABILITY IN INDIA 102
significance of the coefficient /i.11 The details of the theory underlying the multiple struc­
tural break technique is provided in Appendix C. The results for the two breaks analysis 
are reported in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Tests for Unit Roots: Combined revenue and expenditure of central and state 
governments, Two Breaks
Series Years 7 u 0
Nominal Magnitude
Revenue 1963 0.256 0.021 0.126 -0.003 -1.12
1984 (5.19) (2.55) (3.94) (-1.18) (—7.41**)
Expenditure 1976 -0.22 -0.0002 -0.027 -0.041 -2.43
1994 (-5.54) (-0.074) (-0.684) (-3.90) (-8.15**)
Real Magnitude
Revenue 1963 0.273 -0.064 0.168 -0.009 -1.42
1985 (4.29) (-3.92) (3.99) (-2.70) (-7.87**)
Expenditure 1963 0.189 -0.136 0.185 -0.008 -1.44
1984 (2.38) (-4.05) (3.64) (-2.20) (—6.95*)
t-statistic are in parentheses.
**: Significant at 1% level.
*: Significant at 5% level.
Critical values of Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) axe -7.34 (at 1%) and -6.82 (at 5%).
The results show that when the analysis is extended by allowing for two breaks, the null of 
difference stationarity is rejected for the revenue as well as the expenditure series. Hence 
structural breaks indeed play a crucial role in deciding the time series properties of the 
revenue and expenditure series.
The crucial question of selection of model specification (one break against two breaks) 
remains. It is worth mentioning that the literature on endogenous structural breaks is 
based on the fact that if the series is trend stationary instead of 1(1) then any analysis
11Papell reports the finite sample critical values generated under the null of unit root (5yt =  tt)
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done by assuming the series as 1(1) will give incorrect results. The revenue and expenditure 
series for the case of India have been taken as 1(1) until now, whereas the present chapter 
concludes they are in fact trend stationary. Given this information set it will be incorrect 
to take the series as 1(1). The series has to be taken as trend stationary with structural 
breaks as Perron (1989, Page 1389) clearly mentions “Hence for all practical purposes, it 
may be more advantageous to adopt the trend stationary view with breaks and de-trend our 
series accordingly prior to analyzing the remaining noise”.
Hence in order to avoid any subjectivity, bias and ignorance, the models selected are the 
ones for which the series turn out to be trend stationary with structural break(s). Hence 
it can be concluded that the combined revenue and expenditure series are trend stationary 
rather than difference stationary. These findings are crucial for time series analysis of these 
series. The nature of the series is critical to the frequently used cointegration analysis 
and ECM mechanisms as these techniques can be used if, and only if, the series under 
consideration are non-stationary and integrated of the same order.
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4.6 Conclusions
This chapter has revisited an important policy issue in the Indian context - sustainability of 
the public debt. It began by spelling out the result that if public expenditure and revenues 
are both stationary or non-stationary and cointegrated with a cointegrating vector of [1,- 
1], public debt is sustainable. However, critical to this is the correct determination of the 
time series properties of the expenditure and revenue series, in particular to account for 
structural breaks.
Whereas standard ADF tests have revealed the public expenditure and revenue series in 
India to be 7(1), this chapter has generalized this analysis by admitting structural breaks. 
This analysis is conducted by taking the combined revenue of India’s state and central 
governments. Public expenditure and revenue are found to be 7(0) with regime shifts. 
The endogenously determined dates of structural breaks are close to some major economic 
events that have affected Indian economy in last 50 years as reported in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Dates of structural breaks
Date of Structural Break Event
Revenue
1961
1962 Indo-China War
1963
1984
1985 Initiation of first phase of financial reforms
Expenditure
1961 Indo-China War in 1962
1963 Indo-China War in 1962
1975 Oil Price shock 1974
1976
1994 Rupee made fully convertible 
on current account in 1993
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Hence the results of the extant literature suggesting public debt in India as unsustainable 
may not be as robust as previously thought.
Chapter 5
Incomplete Reforms: The Role of Banking 
Sector in Credit Transmission Mechanism
in India
5.1 In trodu ction
Both the financial crisis of 1991 and the subsequent initiation of the financial reform in In­
dia has generated considerable interest in the recent literature ((Cerra and Saxena, 2002), 
(Shirai, 2002), (Bhattacharya and Patel, 2003), (Bhide et ah, 2001)).1 This chapter ad­
dresses the question: Has the financial liberalization of recent years affected the monetary 
transmission mechanism by altering the channels through which it operates? There is 
renewed interest in the literature towards the bank lending channel of transmission of 
monetary policy (For example, Thornton and Wheelock (1995)). According to this chan­
nel real economic activity can be affected through the supply of loans in the financial sector 
and keeping interest rates broadly unchanged. Banks respond to a monetary contraction 
through decreasing the supply of loans thereby adversely affecting the aggregate output 
^ h is  literature has been surveyed in chapter 2.
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and inflation in the economy. The basic underlying assumption for the existence of a credit 
channel is imperfection in the capital markets and it is argued that this channel tends to 
weaken with financial innovation and liberalization of capital markets (Kashyap and Stein, 
1994).
As discussed in chapter 2 the post-reform decade in India has been characterized by the 
efforts to reduce inefficiencies in the financial sector thereby making it more competitive. 
The aim of the present chapter is to test the importance of the banking sector as a credit 
transmission channel in India’s post reform period. Gertler (1995) points out that the 
lending channel for monetary policy is a special case of a financial propagation mecha­
nism. It should be noted that a crucial mechanism of magnification of macroeconomic 
disturbances is through the banking sector. This has been elaborated in the theoretical 
framework discussed in chapter 3. The present chapter will empirically test the above 
underlying assumption of the importance of banking sector in the theoretical framework. 
The extant literature based on the tests of a bank lending channel2 using aggregate data 
tests for the significant impact of credit on aggregate output which in turn is assumed to 
be evidence of the existence of bank lending channel. One drawback of these studies is 
that they do not distinguish between credit supply and credit demand.
The impact of credit on output may be the result of two possible scenarios: a) adjustment 
in the credit market is through the demand side and b) adjustment in the credit market 
is through the supply side. The bank lending channel will be significant in the second 
scenario only if the credit supply adjusts in response to an exogenous shock (Bernanke and 
Blinder, 1988). Hence it is imperative to investigate the supply side of the credit market 
in order to reach any conclusion about the bank lending channel.
There are two principal contributions in this chapter. First, using aggregate data, a cointe-
2Please note that the terms ‘bank lending channel’ and ‘credit channel’ are used interchangeably 
throughout the thesis.
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grating relationship is established between the interest rate spread (difference between the 
lending rate and banks’ return on investment) and bank credit thus indicating the long-run 
response of bank credit to changes in this spread. Second, the response of bank credit to 
an exogenous shock is identified and the short-run dynamics tested to check if bank loans 
adjust significantly in the direction of equilibrium. As far as is known, such an analy­
sis involving the estimation of a long-run relationship and understanding the short-run 
dynamics of the credit market has not previously been attempted in the extant literature.
The chapter is planned as follows: Section 2 motivates the analysis by discussing the role of 
banks in the lending channel and outlining the necessary conditions that should be satisfied 
for a significant impact of bank credit in monetary policy transmission. Section 3 briefly 
summarizes the empirical literature on credit channels based on tests using aggregate data. 
Section 4 empirically identifies credit supply and its determinants for India. Since the data 
span a period with considerable policy change there is the possibility that any long run 
relation may involve a regime change. This indeed turns out to be the case for this data set. 
Hence the cointegration technique allowing for regime change is applied. A structurally 
stable long run relationship for bank credit with significant coefficients on the interest rate 
spread is discovered. The estimation of short run dynamics reveals that once such regime 
change is allowed for, bank loans indeed adjust significantly in the direction of equilibrium 
after the system is subjected to an exogenous shock. Thus it can be concluded that banks 
play a critical role in the transmission mechanism and the results of this chapter support 
an important underlying assumption of the model (i.e. banks’ importance in the credit 
transmission mechanism) developed in chapter 3, further validating the robustness of the 
theoretical model. Section 5 concludes.
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5.2 M otivation
The conventional theory of monetary transmission is the “money” view or the view repre­
sented by the standard textbook IS-LM model (Kashyap and Stein, 1993). In its simplest 
form, there are two assets in the economy: money and bonds. The banks’ have a passive 
role - they create money by issuing demand deposits and invest in bonds. A tight monetary 
policy, say an increase in the reserve requirement ratio, will force banks to reduce the issue 
of demand deposits and hence bond holdings. In a two sector model including households, 
this will lead to less money and more bonds for the households. Under the assumption of 
sticky prices the real wealth of households will decrease leading to a rise in interest rates 
adversely affecting investment and aggregate output.
According to proponents of the lending view or the capital-market-imperfections approach 
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1995), the two asset specification in the money view may be too 
simplistic. In an alternative specification, the lending view considers three assets: money, 
publicly issued bonds and loans under the assumption that bonds and loans are imperfect 
substitutes. The banks in this framework make credit or loans in addition to creating 
money. Therefore monetary policy shocks can be transmitted through two independent 
channels: the interest rate channel and through impact on the supply of credit (Kashyap 
and Stein, 1993). This view emphasizes the importance of the lending channel.
If the lending channel exists in an economy it is possible to significantly affect investment 
and output without much change in the interest rate. The quantitative significance of the 
lending channel is sensitive to the institutional characteristics of financial markets and can 
thus be used as a measure of the extent of financial liberalization in the economy (Kashyap 
and Stein, 1994). It is imperative to analyst the significance of the lending channel as 
this will help in investigating the importance of financial sector reforms to the impact of 
monetary policy.
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Bernanke and Blinder (1988) suggest three necessary conditions for the existence of the 
lending channel:
• Bank credit and open-market bonds should not be perfect substitutes for borrowers 
in the economy. In other words, borrowers can not simply offset the decrease in bank 
loans by borrowing from the bond market. In that scenario there will be no real 
effect from monetary shocks in the economy.
A traditional view is that this condition is likely to hold in the Indian banking sector 
as other debt alternatives like debt and equity markets and Non Banking Finance 
Companys (NBFCs) are still developing and are at a nascent stage. Table 5.1 reports 
the share of deposits with NBFCs from 1970 to 1999.
Table 5.1: Deposits with Non-Banking Financial Companies
Period As % of Bank Deposits % of GDP
1970-71 to 1974-75 0.71 0.02
1975-76 to 1979-80 0.68 0.16
1980-81 to 1984-85 0.46 0.14
1985-86 to 1989-90 0.81 0.30
1990-91 to 1992-93 1.18 0.45
1993-94 5.02 2.02
1994-95 6.01 2.52
1995-96 8.11 3.28
1996-97 9.47 3.90
1997-98 3.70 1.57
1998-99 2.65 1.16
Source: RBI (2003b)
• It should be noted that equity markets have grown rapidly during the post reform 
period. The market capitalization to GDP ratio has increased from 5.6 per cent in 
1983 to 43 per cent in 2002-03 and the primary equity market is attracting a number 
of successful issues like Initial Public Offerings (IPO’s) of Maruti Udyog Limited.
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The issues mainly include public sector stocks, bank stocks or large corporates which 
are popular among retail investors. But there is still a lack of confidence among 
investors for other issues. On the other hand, in 2003, public sector banks accounted 
for almost 80 per cent of total assets in the economy (CII, 2004). Depositors tend 
to have more confidence in the PSBs (most of them owned by the government) as 
they perceive an implicit government guarantee is attached, making it very unlikely 
a deposit-run would take place even if such a bank was on the verge of insolvency 
(Bhattacharya and Patel, 2003).
• The supply of credit should be affected if the central bank alters the quantity of 
reserves to the banking system. This condition essentially requires that any mone­
tary shock in the economy should lead to adjustments in credit supply rather than 
credit demand. Banks can insulate their lending activity, and keep the flow of credit 
unchanged, from an adverse reserves shock only if they reduce their dependence on 
deposits and keep a “buffer stock” by investing in non-deposit based sources of fi­
nance like equity markets, issuance of time deposits or Certificate of Deposits (CDs) 
etc. In the case of post reform India due to some stringent measures of risk manage­
ment, banks are indeed showing interest in the equity market and alternative sources 
of finance by the central bank.
However, the share of such investments is very low and government securities are 
mainly preferred for investment, due to the low risk involved. The government’s 
high deficits in the post reform period have forced the issue of large numbers of 
government securities to raise money. In fact, at the end of September 2003, the 
assets of commercial banks in government securities3 was around 45 per cent which 
is much higher than SLR of 25 per cent.4 Therefore as Bhattacharya and Patel (2003,
3These include central government securities such as treasury bills with different periods of maturity.
4As reported in RBI Weekly Supplement, October 11, 2003.
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Page 18) point out for the banks: “In deciding on a trade-off between credit flows and 
investing in government securities, the economic, regulatory and fiscal environment 
is stacked against the f o r m e r Hence banks will be reluctant to offset a credit crunch 
by laying off some of its investment in government securities, at least in the short 
run. Therefore it is very unlikely the banking sector will be insulated from adverse 
reserves shock in the economy and keep its credit supply unchanged. Hence there 
should be some adjustment from the supply side of the credit market. Figure 5.1 
elaborates on this issue through a simple demand-supply analysis of the credit market 
using bank credit Lt and lending rate i\.
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Credit Supply
Credit Demand
Figure 5.1: Credit Market
The credit market equilibrated at E, once subjected to a shock will move to say E'. The 
interest here is the short run adjustment in the market. If a lending channel is at work in 
the economy it will return to equilibrium through two possible paths: path s or path sd. 
Along the first path total adjustment is through the supply side and credit demand remains 
unaffected. This is an extreme case of the existence of a credit channel. In the second path 
the adjustment starts in the direction of credit supply and then the system eventually 
returns to the initial equilibrium. The other extreme would be that total adjustment
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is through the demand side (which is not shown in the figure). The chapter intends to 
empirically investigate the short run adjustment in bank credit for the case of India. A 
significant adjustment in the direction of equilibrium will suggest that the potential paths 
for adjustments will be either path s or sd. In these cases it can be concluded that banks 
play a crucial role in the credit transmission mechanism in India.
• The third necessary condition for the existence of the lending channel is imperfect 
price adjustment in the economy so that monetary policy can have real effects. There 
is a huge literature (For example see Anderson (1994)) which suggests prices are 
indeed “sticky” in the inefficient and developing financial sectors like those in India.
Whereas evidence exists for the first and third conditions, the second condition needs to 
be formally empirically tested. This has not yet been attempted and forms the core of the 
analysis in this chapter. The empirical literature in this area which is broadly based on 
testing the bank lending channel is discussed next.
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5.3 Literature
The empirical literature on the bank lending channel can be divided into two broad cate­
gories: tests using aggregate time-series data and tests using cross-section or panel data. 
The seminal paper by Bernanke (1983) indicated the importance of the bank lending 
channel. Bernanke examined the Great Depression period of 1930-33 and quantified the 
contribution of the traditional interest rate channel to the sharp decline in aggregate out­
put. He concluded this channel did not explain a significant part of the decline in output. 
This component was better explained by the crisis in the banking sector during the period. 
This evidence supported the view that the supply of bank loans may have had an impact 
on aggregate output.
Using structural VARs Bernanke (1986) further confirmed that shocks to credit had sig­
nificant real effects on output and were independent of the shocks to other government 
spending. This evidence supports one of the necessary conditions of the existence of the 
bank lending channel: loans are imperfect substitutes for other sources of financing.
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) investigate whether monetary policy can shift the supply 
curve of credit by examining the co-movements between credit and aggregate output. The 
authors conclude that an increase in the interest rate reduces banks’ credit, and subse­
quently, economic output. However, this response of credit is gradual and occurs with 
a lag. Römer and Römer (1990) confirm that while money leads output, credit moves 
contemporaneously with output. Collated together such evidence tends to weaken the 
argument for the lending channel.
On the other hand Kashyap and Stein (1994) believe this evidence may not be contradictory 
to the existence of the lending channel because a recession may immediately lead to a rise in 
credit demand from small firms feeling the credit crunch and even if the credit supply was
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falling, it would not be manifested as a decrease in the total volume of credit. Thus there 
is an identification problem which cannot distinguish between credit supply and credit 
demand.
Kashyap et al. (1993) address this identification problem by considering the relative fluctu­
ations between bank credit and its close substitute commercial paper. They argue that the 
movement in the issuance of commercial paper should trace the demand for bank loans. 
Therefore a system can be identified under this assumption: for example if bank credit 
is falling and the issuance of commercial paper rising implies the fall in bank credit was 
due to a contraction in credit supply and not in credit demand. The empirical evidence 
in Kashyap et ai. (1993) suggests that with a tight monetary policy, there is an increase 
in the issuance of commercial paper and a gradual decline in bank loans. The authors 
further confirm that shifts in loans supply can independently explain the movements in 
inventory investment which could not be explained by alluding to the conventional interest 
rate channel. The authors repeated the study by using the relative prices, i.e., the gap 
between lending rate and commercial paper rate and confirmed that with tightening mon­
etary policy, the prime rate rises relative to the commercial paper rate thereby supporting 
the lending view. A similar study by Hoshi et al. (1991) confirm these results for Japan. 
However, these studies stop short of identifying precisely the behavior of credit supply 
in the economy. Moreover, most of the empirical evidence based on the aggregate data 
for bank lending channel is available for the developed economies and not for developing 
countries.
The discussion now proceeds to the empirical analysis and tests the second necessary 
condition of the existence of the lending channel i.e. whether banks’ credit is significantly 
affected by a monetary policy shock. The essential point is to understand the impact of 
interest rate spread on credit availability. Bank credit availability will be affected by the
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difference between the returns from its investment and the lending rate. This difference can 
be perceived as a profit margin. Establishing a relationship between bank credit availability 
and its profit margin involves a two step procedure in case the variables are non-stationary: 
a) To check whether the profit margin has a significant long-run relationship with credit 
availability5 and b) To establish whether in the short run the changes in the profit margin 
lead to a significant adjustment of bank credit towards the equilibrium.
5.4 Empirical Analysis
The empirical methodology involves the use of the most popular methodology to find a 
long run relationship between integrated variables-cointegration analysis. Consider the 
following fully specified regression model:
yt = (3 xt 4- et (5.1)
The above specification assumes the error terms et are stationary, white noise processes. 
This may not be true if yt and x t are integrated series. For example if x t and yt are 
both / ( l )  and hence growing with time trends, the difference between them should also be 
growing unless there is a ß  such that
et = yt -  ß x t et ~  7(0)
In such a case the difference between the two series is not exploding and is stable at a fixed
mean which is 7(0). The two series are then said to be cointegrated and the vector [1, — ß] is
called the cointegrating vector. The cointegration technique allows for distinction between
5If in the long-run relationship, profit margin is positively related to the credit availability then in 
standard parlance this will be called the supply equation.
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the long run relationship between the vectors yt and x t and the short run dynamics i.e. the 
deviation of yt from its long run trend. The particular interest here is in such a analysis 
in order to investigate the existence of a stable relationship of credit supply and the path 
through which it returns to its equilibrium in the short run after being subjected to an 
exogenous shock. The short run dynamics of a cointegrating relationship can be captured 
through its alternative representation: Vector Error Correction Model (VECM). The 
representation of the error correction model is in terms of three variables: Ayt — y t ~  Vt-i, 
A x t and (yt — ßx t) which are all 7(0) assuming the existence of cointegrating vector[l, —ß\. 
The error correction model can be specified as:
Ayt =  d'zt +  'y(Axt) +  A(yt -  ß x t) +  et (5.2)
The above equation describes variation in yt in terms of 7(0) exogenous variables zt, the 
variation of x t and the error correction term (yt—ßxt) representing the short run adjustment 
towards the long run equilibrium. It is to be noted that yt—ß x t will be stationary only when 
yt and x t are cointegrated and hence VECM is an alternative representation of cointegration 
which clearly distinguishes between the long run and short run adjustments towards the 
stable cointegrated relationship. The particular interest here is in the coefficient A whose 
magnitude shows the speed of adjustment in the short run and the sign shows the direction 
of adjustment. For example if A is negative and \yt — ßx t \ > 0 the short run adjustment is 
towards the long run equilibrium and the system is stable in the sense that it will return 
to its initial equilibrium after being subjected to a shock (Greene, 1997).
The number of linearly independent cointegrating vectors existing in the equilibrium sys­
tem is called its cointegrated rank. The maximum and minimum value of cointegrating 
rank may lie between k — 1 and 1, respectively, where k is the number of variables in vector 
yt- Johansen proposes a test to determine the cointegrating rank by estimating VECM
CHAPTER 5. CREDIT TRANSMISSION MECHANISM IN INDIA 119
using maximum likelihood estimation. The estimation is done under various assumptions 
regarding the restrictions on the parameter and trends and subsequently conducting like­
lihood ratio tests. Johansen suggests two tests for determining the cointegrating rank 
r .
• The Lambda-Max Test: The test is based on the Log likelihood ratio ln{Lmax{r) /  Lmax{r+
1)] and is conducted sequentially for r = 0 ,1 ,2 .... k — 1. The null hypothesis is that
the cointegrating rank is equal to r against the alternative that the cointegrating 
rank is equal to r +  1.
• The Trace Test: The test is based on the Log likelihood ratio ln[Lmax(r)/ Lmax(k)\
and is conducted sequentially for r = k — 1 ,.... 1,0. The null hypothesis is that the
cointegrating rank is equal to r  against the alternative that the cointegrating rank is 
equal to k.
5.4.1 D ata  and R esults
As discussed earlier, commercial banks in India invest heavily in government securities to 
minimize risks. Thus, at the end of September 2003, the assets of commercial banks in 
government securities was around 45 per cent much higher than the SLR of 25 per cent. 
Hence the spread between the lending rate and the returns from banks’ investment in 
securities are the crucial determinants of credit availability in India. Therefore the prime 
lending rate (ilt) and the yield on 91-day Government Treasury Bills (ibth) are taken as 
variables for the cointegration analysis. Also taken is the banks’ investment (bht) which is 
the sum of their holdings of government securities and other approved securities, and the 
real activity in the economy measured by the IIP (yt).6 A variable is required to indicate
6This is the only activity variable for which data is available on a monthly basis.
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the extent of liberalization in the economy. This is to be used as a control variable in order 
to help isolate the effect of liberalization policies from the effect of the bank spread and 
other variables on credit availability.
banking industry. The Herfindahl Index H is a concentration indicator and can be used to 
examine the concentration and evolution of the banking industry during the post reform 
decade (Juan-Ramon et al., 2001). The index H is defined as:
where Ai is ith banks attribute measuring its size based on its assets or deposits and N  
is the number of banks under consideration. Theoretically, the minimum and maximum 
value of H can be 1 and 100 respectively, with the value of one indicating totally even 
distribution or a perfectly competitive banking sector and the value of 100 indicating a
and the upper limit is 100. Juan-Ramon et al. (2001) suggest that since the index H is 
dependent on number of banks which varies across bank group and periods, the ratio of 
H and minimum bound for each bank should be reported as it removes the influence of 
banks. The value of the Herfindahl Index for all commercial banks based on assets and 
deposits is reported in Table 5.2.
One possibility is to use an index of concentration (e.g. the Herfindahl index) in the
very high concentration or monopoly. For any number N  the lower limit of H is
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Table 5.2: Herfindahl Index: All Commercial Banks
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2002 2003
D eposit Based
Herfindahl Index 6.6 6.5 7.0 7.0 7.1 7.0
100
N 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1
Ratio 6.6 6.5 7.0 6.4 6.5 6.4
A sset Based  
Herfindahl Index 7.6 7.3 7.6 7.6 7.4 7.6
100
N 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1
Ratio 7.6 7.3 7.6 6.9 6.7 6.9
Source: Shirai (2002), updated by author.
The Herfindahl Index reveals the concentration of the banking sector is more or less un­
changed from 1997-2003.7 This evidence reveals that the bank concentration indicator 
cannot be used as a potential variable to capture the liberalization process in the Indian 
financial sector. In any case data on this and other concentration variables, e.g. the share 
of public sector banks in total credit is only available on an annual basis.
The nominal average monthly exchange rate (et) is used with respect to the US dollar 
for this purpose.8 This is for at least two reasons: First, the progressive liberalization 
of India’s exchange rate and external accounts has widely been cited as an indicator of 
India’s opening up, in particular, and economic reform in general. Second the interest 
is in analyzing the impact of devaluation on bank performance as outlined in chapter 3. 
The banks’ performance is sensitive to variations in the exchange rate. Hence it is natural 
to use the exchange rate with respect to India’s dominant trading partner.9 A central
7The index prior to 1997 could not be calculated because of inconsistency in the data.
8This is because most of the external trade in India is dollar denominated. Moreover, the US has 
emerged as India’s main trading partner in the last decade: the share of Indian exports to America 
increased by 9 per cent to 25 per cent during the period 1991-2000 as reported by the Federal Ministry of 
Commerce, India.
9However the final form of the cointegrating vector is parsimonious as the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of exchange rate is zero can not be rejected. The results remain qualitatively the same if the 
real effective exchange rate based on trade weights of 36 countries is used for the analysis.
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purpose of this chapter is to assess how much of an effect financial liberalization has had 
on the credit transmission channel. It is natural, therefore to take the period when such 
liberalization was initiated as the starting point. Hence the data set begins at April 1992, 
and ends in July 2003, which is the latest period for which consistent data are available. 
Monthly data taken from various issued of Reserve Bank of India Bulletin (RBI, 2003d) 
are used and the data set spans 136 months. Figure 5.2 presents the plots and Table 5.3 
the summary statistics for all variables.
Table 5.3: Summary Statistics: April 1992-July 2003
Variable Notation Min. Max. Mean St. deviation Units
Bank Credit u 3590.68 15434.40 8013.36 3537.61 Rs. Billion
Bank Investment bht 915.65 6070.61 2562.81 1361.64 Rs. Billion
TB rate AbhLt 4.77 13.16 9.65 2.18 % per annum
Lending Rate i\ 11.50 19.00 14.05 2.06 % per annum
Real IIP* yt 0.92 1.23 1.02 0.06 Index
Exchange Rate et 28.46 49.02 38.93 6.85 Rs/US$
*•. B a se  Y eax:1995
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Figure 5.2: Data Plots (April 1992 - July 2003)
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The presence of unit roots in the variables are tested for, and a check on, whether all the 
variables are 7(1) and can thus be used for the cointegration analysis, is done. The results 
from the ADF10 tests are reported in Table 5.4:
Table 5.4: Unit Root Tests
Variable Notation Estimate P value* Series
TB Rate qbhLt -0.004 0.93 m
Lending Rate A -0.087 0.29 / ( i )
Credit Lt -0.070 0.34 m
Bank Investment bht -0.380 0.99 m
Output Vt -0.352 0.13 m
Exchange Rate et -0.054 0.73 m
*: Null Hypothesis- Unit Root Present
The variables for the cointegration analysis are taken in log real terms except the lending 
rate, exchange rate and TB rate. The results confirm that all the variables are non­
stationary. The plots show a time trend in all the series and seasonality especially in 
monthly output. Hence we allow for a time trend in the cointegration space along with 
seasonal dummies. Johansen’s cointegration method is used for the analysis. Prior to that 
the weak exogeneity test is conducted. The weak exogeneity hypothesis for output, ex­
change rate, lending rate, TB rate and bank investment, based on Wu-Hausman statistics, 
is rejected at the 1 per cent level. These tests indicate that none of these variables is 
weakly exogenous and therefore they all belong in the cointegrating vector. The results 
from the lambda-max test for cointegration rank are reported in Table 5.5:
10The KPSS test which does not have a bias in favor of accepting non-stationaxity also indicates that 
each of these variables is 7(1).
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Table 5.5: Cointegration: Rank Test*1
Rank Test Statistic 90% Critical Value Conclusion6
0 44.54 40.76 Reject
1 23.77 35.04 Accept
2 21.89 29.13 Accept
3 11.19 23.10 Accept
4 9.46 17.18 Accept
5 5.77 10.55 Accept
a: LR test (Lambda-max test) HO: r cointegrated vectors; HA: r +  1 cointegrating vectors 
b: Test concludes r  =  1
The test reveals that there is exactly one long run relationship. The trace test also yields 
the same and the results are skipped here. Thus the long-run relationship (the cointegrating 
vector) will take the following form:
7o Lt -1- 7 i t +  72 4 +  73 ibth +  74 Vt +  7s bht +  et =  0 (5.3)
where t is the time trend and [7 0 , 7 1 , 7 2 , 7 3 , 7 4 , 7 5 , 76] is the cointegrating vector. The
cointegrating vector estimated by Johansen (1988)’s procedure are given in Table 5.6.
Based on the Akaike’s Information Criteria, a lag length of three is used. The second row
gives the unrestricted vector. Since there is only one cointegrating vector, initially just 
one homonizing restriction can be placed on the cointegrating vector. Credit’s coefficient 
is normalized to one i.e. 70 =  1. The results are presented in the third row of the table. 
Identification of this cointegrating vector is done by imposing restrictions suggested by 
economic theory. As discussed above bank credit is determined by the spread between two 
policy variables (4 and i\h) i.e. i\ — ihth. It requires to test for a cointegration relationship of 
the following form: [l,7 i, —7 2 , 7 2 , 0, 0, 0]. Testing for the existence of such a cointegrating 
relationship will involve imposing more than one restriction or imposing over-identifying 
restrictions. The over identifying restrictions are tested using the Log-likelihood ratio test
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statistics under the null hypothesis that the restrictions hold and the statistic is distributed 
as a x 2 variate with degrees of freedom equal to the number of over-identifying restrictions. 
The results are reported in the last row of Table 5.6. In this case, only three over-identifying 
restrictions are accepted by the LR test: 72+73 =  0, 75 =  0, 76 =  0 and the null hypothesis 
tha t the restrictions hold is accepted with x2(3) =  2.21 and P value of 0.53.
Table 5.6: Cointegrating Vectors 
Lt bht i\ i\h yt et Trend
Unrestricted
-0.990 0.299 0.033 -0.005 2.210 0.023 0.001
Credit Normalized to 1
1.000 -0.299 -0.033 0.005 -2.210 -0.023 -0.001
Identified Cointegrated Space*
1.000 -  ^ÖÖIÖ 0.010 -9.096 -  -0.0Q5
*: Over-Identifying Restrictions Accepted x2(3) =  2.21 P  value =  0.529
The tests for model specifications namely: serial correlation, functional form and Normality 
are reported in Table 5.7. The results confirm the absence of serial autocorrelation and 
justify the functional form. The null of normality is rejected at 2 per cent level but that 
should not be taken as a serious problem because, as Gonzalo (1994) points out, Johansen’s 
cointegration method is robust even with non-normal errors.
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Table 5.7: Misspecification Tests
Test Statistics LM  Version F Version
Serial Correlation 2.28 2.04
[0.13] [0.15]
Functional Form 2.96 2.66
[0.085] [0.10]
Normality 7.33 -
[0.026] -
P  values in square brackets.
The long run relationship between bank credit and its profit margin is given by the iden­
tified cointegrating vector:
Lt = 0.005 t +  9.09 yt +  0.010 (i[ -  i\h) 
(2.33) (0.68) (0.27)
(5.4)
where t-statistics are in parentheses.
Equation 5.4 represents a long-run relationship between bank credit and its determinants, 
the interest rate spread between the lending rate and treasury bill rate. Theoretically, the 
bank’s credit should increase with the increase in spread as it makes lending more attractive 
compared with investment in any alternative financial market, ceteric paribus. The above 
equation depicts the correct sign for the spread but the coefficient is not significant. The 
error correction equation for the credit gives the value of A =  —0.01 with t-stats of -2.45, 
which is significant at 1.6 per cent. This implies that in the short run, bank credit adjusts 
significantly and relatively fast in the direction of the long run credit supply.
The long run cointegrating relationship with insignificant coefficient and error correction 
term with significant coefficients are apparently conflicting results. One underlying reason 
behind the conflict may be that estimated parameters in the cointegrating relationship may 
be unstable. In particular, the Indian economy faced many exogenous shocks and policy
CHAPTER 5. CREDIT TRANSMISSION MECHANISM IN INDIA 128
changes in the post reform decade (Callen and Cashin, 2002).11 These had significant effects 
and may have caused parameter estimates to change over time. Thus it is very important 
to incorporate regime changes or structural breaks in the analysis and ensure the long-run 
parameter estimates are structurally stable before interpreting the long-run relationship 
between the variables. The tests suggested by Hansen (1992) are used to examine the 
hypothesis of parameter instability in the cointegrated models. Hansen suggests tests for 
parameter instability as an alternative test for cointegration between two 1(1) variables. 
In the context here this amounts to estimating the following model:
Zt — At Xt + €t (5-5)
where Zt is credit and X t is a vector of regressors namely the spread (i[ — ibth) and the 
output (yt) and A t is a vector of parameters. The presence of parameter stability results 
in the uniform convergence of the estimated regression coefficients to the cointegrating 
relationship in the whole space of the sample. Hansen (1992) describes three test statistics 
for testing parameter instability in the context of fully modified estimation of cointegrated 
regression models. These are: Sup F test, Mean F test and the Lc test.12 For all three 
tests the null hypothesis is the same - A t is constant but these tests differ on alternative 
hypothesis. Hansen (1992) points out that no cointegration is a special case of the alterna­
tive hypothesis for which the Lc statistics is an LM  test statistics and hence he concludes 
that Lc ia a test of null of cointegration against the alternative of no cointegration.
U  = 3.45 +  0.006 1 +  0.26 yt +  0.023 (4 -  i f 1)
(66.97) (17.28) (1.04) (2.57)
(5.6)
11 It should be noted the tests for endogenous structural breaks at unit root stage were applied and the 
null hypothesis of series being 7(1) could not be rejected.
12 All the three tests assume unknown timing of the structural break.
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M = 0.57
SupF =  7.66 [> 0.20]
MeanF =  4.62 [> 0.20]
Lc = 0.50 [0.12]
Here M  refers to the bandwidth parameter selected according to the recommendations of 
Andrews (1991) using univariate AR(1) approximating models. All the estimated regres­
sion coefficients and t-statistics are the fully modified estimates of Phillips and Hansen 
(1990).13
Figures in parentheses in Equation 5.6 indicate corresponding t-values and in square brack­
ets the p-values. This test does not reject the null of cointegration. The SupF test, under 
the alternative hypothesis of parameter instability, is focussed on any abrupt shift in the 
cointegrating vector. The results reject the alternative hypothesis of instability. This is 
further evident from the plot of the F-stats sequences shown below. The actual F-statistic 
does not exceed any of the critical values thereby indicating parameter stability.14 
13The estimation is using the Gauss code provided by Bruce E. Hansen.
14It should be noted that Hansen’s analysis requires trimming of the data on edges. We have trimmed 
15 per cent of the data from both sides of the sample and hence the analysis is done using the data from 
November-1993 (month 20) to November 2001 (month 116).
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Figure 5.3: F - Statistics Sequence
The cointegrating relationship in Eq. (5.6) suggests that once the unknown structural break 
is accounted for, the coefficient on the spread is significant and the long-run relationship 
is structurally stable. The error correction model is now recalculated using the new stable 
cointegrating vector. The results show the value of A to be —0.076 with a t-statistics of 
-2.60 significant at 1 per cent level. This is further evident from the plot of the persistent 
profile of effect of the system wide shock to the structurally stable cointegrating vector 
shown in Figure 5.4.
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Figure 5.4: Persistent Profile of the effect of system wide shocks to Cointegrating Vector
The plot of the persistence profile of the cointegrating vector clearly shows the long-run 
relationship has a strong tendency to converge to its long-run equilibrium and the speed 
of adjustment is also fast.
The results confirm that bank credit adjusts significantly towards the equilibrium in the 
direction of long-run credit supply. In other words, through their impact on credit supply, 
banks play a crucial role in the transmission of monetary policy shocks.
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5.5 Conclusion
The present chapter has addressed an important issue of identifying and investigating the 
importance of the banking sector in financial propagation mechanism for India. The empir­
ical exercise uses monthly data of the post reform period in India and applies cointegration 
analysis incorporating regime shifts and VECM to test if a monetary shock leads to a 
significant shift in bank credit availability. In other words the significance of the banking 
sector in financial propagation mechanism is tested for. The empirical evidence indicates 
the presence of a structurally stable long run relationship between bank credit and its 
profit margin or spread, and further reveals that in the short run, bank credit does adjust 
significantly in the direction of equilibrium. This confirms the role of banks in transmit­
ting monetary shocks. The results therefore support the underlying assumption of the 
importance of the banking sector in the theoretical framework outlined in chapter 3. The 
results also hint towards the pace of Indian economic reform: it can be safely concluded 
the reform process has not yet reached an extent where capital markets are competitive 
enough to make banks’ role in credit formation insignificant. Public sector banks remain 
a significant source of credit generation in the economy.
Chapter 6
Summary and Conclusions
This dissertation combines the role of credit market distortions in monetary policy trans­
mission and the impact of government policies on the financial sector. To date these have 
been studied separately in the literature. The dissertation formally models partial policy 
reversals subsequent to the introduction of stabilization programs particularly in develop­
ing countries. It then provides empirical support for this result using data from India.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the Indian banking sector emphasizing the possibility 
of policy reversal. The chapter concludes financial sector reform in India is incomplete. 
The banking sector remains inefficient due to several factors viz. high reserves and liquid­
ity requirements, a poor regulatory and supervisory framework, the presence of implicit 
government guarantees and high transaction costs.
Chapter 3 considers the implications of stabilization policy in the context of an economy 
with the broad characteristics discussed in chapter 2 and analyzes the impact of this 
policy on key macroeconomic variables as well as on profitability of the banking sector. 
The chapter develops a stylized model of the interaction between the fiscal and banking 
sectors of the economy during a period of stabilization characterized by fiscal and monetary 
restraint to allow for endogenous policy reversal.
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The policy reversal is further quantified in terms of its offsetting effect. The theoreti­
cal predictions of the model are subsequently tested empirically using Indian data. The 
empirical evidence is found to be consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model.
Chapter 4 confirms the government is solvent in that it satisfies the intertemporal budget 
constraint in the theoretical model used in chapter 3. It is argued that the debate on debt 
sustainability should be examined in the light of recent advances on endogenous structural 
breaks in the cases of unit root analysis and cointegration since revenue and expenditure 
series are susceptible to structural breaks in response to sharp economic shocks . The 
empirical analysis discovers that in the case of India structural breaks or regime shifts play 
a crucial role in time series analysis of revenue and expenditure series. The contributions 
of this chapter are that it provides a basis for testing for debt sustainability even in the 
absence of data on debt; and a methodology for inducting unknown structural breaks in the 
analysis of the sustainability of public debt at both the unit root testing and cointegration 
stages. In the particular case of India, it is discovered that the debt is not unsustainable, 
which is in sharp contrast to the widely prevalent view in extant literature and policy 
discussions.
Chapter 5 empirically tests the importance of the bank lending channel in India. The 
chapter uses aggregate data to establish a long run relationship between the interest rate 
spread and bank credit using cointegration. The analysis further reveals that bank credit 
does adjust significantly in the direction of equilibrium in the short run confirming the role 
of banks in transmitting monetary shocks.
The major findings of the thesis are:
• The offsetting effect attached to stabilization policy can only be eliminated by adopt­
ing a loose monetary policy thereby undermining the government’s initial stabiliza­
tion measures.
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• The combined debt of state and central governments in India is sustainable once the 
regime changes are allowed for.
• The reform process in India that began after the 1991 financial crisis remains incom­
plete and manifests itself in lack of competitiveness in the banking sector.
• The Indian banks play a significant role in the transmission of monetary policy 
through the credit channel.
The above findings lead to several policy lessons as follows:
6.1 P o licy  Lessons
The theoretical and empirical evidence in the dissertation indicate the following policy 
lessons for India:
• The credit channel, relative to the interest rate channel, plays a significant role in 
monetary policy transmission, especially in the post reform period. The impact of 
the interest rate shock on output traced by the generalized impulse response function 
in section 3.4.3 is not significant as evident from the wide confidence bands. On the 
other hand, bank loans indeed adjust significantly in the direction of equilibrium after 
the system is subjected to an exogenous shock, thus indicating the importance of the 
banking sector in monetary policy transmission. Hence government policy should 
emphasize credit generation schemes rather than inefficient interest rate controls. 
Accordingly, potentially effective policy instruments in India are the CRR and SLR 
which directly affect liquidity in the economy through their impact on bank loans.
• Regime shifts in important time series data on India have significant effects on the 
economy. This result argues that while reviewing the impact of extant policies in the
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long run, it is imperative to allow for endogenous regime shifts or economic events. 
For example, this dissertation discovers the public debt in India is not unsustain­
able, in sharp contrast to the widely prevalent view in extant literature and policy 
discussions. This result is also complementary to the findings of Callen and Cashin 
(2002) who examine the solvency and sustainability of India’s external imbalances by 
using an intertemporal model of the current account that allows for capital controls. 
After allowing for endogenous regime shifts, their results indicate the path of India’s 
current account imbalances is sustainable.
• Inefficiencies in the banking sector axe the root cause of an offsetting effect or par­
tial policy reversal following any stabilization program. Chapter 3 shows that this 
offsetting effect cannot be eliminated totally. The recent experiences in India (for 
example the UTI crisis) have shown that soft government policy towards fiscal man­
agement, and political compulsions have led to significant bailouts, adversely affecting 
the government exchequer. Instead of finding alternative ways of financing the off­
setting effect (most of which eventually contributes to a rise in government debt), 
the government should try to minimize it. This can be done via policy shifts. One 
noted example is the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act (FRBMA) 
which came into effect on August 26, 2003. The Act forces the central government to 
“ensure inter-generational equity and rise above populism” (Indian Express (July 2, 
2004)). As part of its strict compliance measures, the Indian government is planning 
to include annual targets of assuming contingent liabilities in the form of guaran­
tees and total liabilities as a percentage of GDP, in its next budget. However, it 
should be noted that the Indian government has a history of non-compliance with 
such Acts. For example FRBMA follows the FRBMB which revises the date of elim­
ination of government revenue deficit, from 2005 to 2008. The delay in stabilization 
reforms can be attributed to a tendency to backtrack. For example, the recently
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elected United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government in India has scrapped the 
disinvestment ministry (the main function of which was to facilitate privatization of 
Public Sector Units (PSUs) as part of economic reform) established by the previ­
ous National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and now going slow on privatization. The 
banking sector remains lacks competition because of the governments “ U-turn from  
the opening of Indian banking sectoY (Business Standard, July 05, 2004). The fi­
nancial reform allowed up to 74 per cent of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the 
private banks. The latest RBI policy in order to diversify the investment has put a 
cap od 10 per cent holding per entity. The entry barriers have also been increased 
for private banks: the minimum capital requirement for new banks is increased from 
Rs. 2 billion to Rs. 3 billion. Such policy pattern will result in less investment in 
the sector, less competition and less efficiency. The broad impact of such policy will 
be increased ineffectiveness of the governments’ stabilization efforts (due to increase 
in the offsetting effect).
6.2 Future D irection s
One obvious question arising from the present dissertation is the significance of the offset­
ting effect attached to a stabilization effort. In future work, the offsetting effect can be 
formally modeled empirically and an econometric test proposed for testing its significance.
Another issue not explicitly modeled in the present dissertation is the time inconsistency 
of government policy. Ex ante government commits to a policy of financial discipline 
and could be reluctant to commit to explicit bank bailouts to avoid moral hazard (which 
reduces banks’ incentive to monitor loans) but ex post the government could opt for bailing 
out banks because of the cost of liquidation or other political compulsions. This further
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leads to the question of credibility of government policy. The government can stick to its 
commitment of financial discipline only if it has a strong incentive to build credibility on 
economic reforms. However it may be very difficult in democratic countries like India where 
the effective government horizon is short due to political instability and it may be forced 
to succumb to populism in order to ensure survival. These questions may be addressed 
in a theoretical set up focussing on interaction of the banking sector and government 
incorporating time inconsistency and moral hazard.
Finally, for the case of India, a program of rapidly attaining and maintaining debt sustain­
ability can be integrated with the notion of pro-poor fiscal adjustment as adjudged in Jha 
( 2004).
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER ONE
_______________________  A ppendix A ________________________
A.X UTI Crisis
The section is compiled from the www.rediff.com archives. UTI mutual fund commenced 
operation on July 1964. It was established by the central government to channel community 
savings into productive uses in order to speed up industrial growth. To quote then Finance 
Minister T.T. Krishnamachari “the trust would be open to any person or institutions to 
purchase the units offered by the trust. However, this institution as we see it, is intended to 
cater to the needs of individual investors, and even among them as far as possible, to those 
whose means are small. ” The main objective of the UTI was to invest retail savings in the 
capital market and pass the benefits back to small investors. UTI had a monopoly in the 
funds industry until 1986. Subsequently, PSBs sponsored funds entered the market and in 
1993 there were 8 mutual funds. After 1993 private sector mutual funds were allowed. The 
funds industry has grown at a compounded average rate of 27 per cent from an asset base 
of Rs. 250 million in 1964 to its current size of Rs. 900 billion. The share of UTI is around 
Rs. 600 billion. UTI invests about a quarter of this through the US-64 fund, India’s largest, 
and accounts for about 15 per cent of the domestic mutual fund industry’s assets in a year. 
The mutual funds (particularly UTI) are very popular among small investors and became
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even more attractive in 1996 when the mutual fund dividend returned by equity-oriented 
schemes was exempted from tax.
In mid 2002, the UTI bank decided to skip a dividend for its flagship US-64 scheme for 
the year 2001-02. This was because the Net Asset Value (NAV) of the scheme had eroded 
sharply and was much lower than its face value of Rs.10. On 1st August, 2002 the NAV of 
US-64 was Rs.5.80.
This was the first time the UTI had skipped paying a dividend for the US-64 scheme, since 
its inception in 1964. The UTI Board decided to skip a dividend as the government had 
been providing budgetary support to unit holders, to bridge the gap between the NAV 
and repurchase price of 2001. In the period January-June 2002 the Security and Exchange 
Board of India (SEBI) reported that the UTI had redemption/repurchase to the tune of 
over Rs.63 billion against a mobilization of just Rs. 6.3 billion. All the Minimum Income 
Plans (MIPs) schemes of the UTI showed negative reserves on 30 June 2002. According to a 
report by SEBI, 35 out of 63 schemes (whose unaudited results were available) had negative 
reserves. For the MIP schemes, negative reserves totalled up to Rs.30 billion. MIP97(III) 
had negative reserves of Rs. 2.6 billion and MIP97(IV) had negative reserves of Rs. 2.5 
billion. For the three years between 1999 and 2002, UTI consistently lost market share in 
terms of net assets. On 31 March 1999, UTI had a 77 per cent market share with assets at 
Rs. 531.45 billion out of total Rs. 681.93 billion. These figures dropped dramatically over 
the following years and on 30 June 2002 the market share of UTI was 46 per cent with 
assets amounting to Rs.463.96 billion out of total Rs. 1007.03 billion. UTI’s investments 
make up 11 per cent of the value of all stocks traded on the Bombay Stock Exchange.
The collapse of UTI began in 1999. The UTI mutual fund scheme was ailing, the gov­
ernment had issued a Special Securities Scheme for Rs. 33 billion by taking over a large 
percentage of public sector scrips which had a considerably lower book value. The govern-
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ment continued to pay interest of 11.2 per cent to the trust until 2002. UTI had not paid 
any dividend to the government until then. However, things did not turn out as planned 
and due to harsh market conditions, especially with the tech meltdown, US-64 holdings fell 
by Rs.10 billion during January to November 2001. The problem was aggravated because 
unlike most open ended schemes US-64 did not declare its NAV on a daily basis.
In 2001-02, the government provided a cash support of Rs. 3 billion to US-64 following 
the sudden freezing of sale and repurchase of units on 2nd July 2001. In 2002, the central 
government doled out Rs. 5 billion and promised another Rs.5 billion for the US-64 scheme 
to meet the difference between its net assets value and the administered repurchase price. 
The government planned to work out a tax concession package to enthuse investors to 
remain with the scheme after May 2003. A committee was set up to investigate the matter 
and make recommendations. The committee revealed certain weaknesses in investments 
made by UTI. These were:
• Bad investments, including in firms it had been warned against investing in by its 
own internal advisory team. For example, UTI lost Rs 328 million investing in an 
Internet company against the advice of their own research department.
• All 19 individual investment decisions of the trust were imprudent and turned out to 
be in error.
Apart from these investment inconsistencies, the stock scam in 2001 revealed the unhealthy 
nexus between the UTI (and possibly other mutual funds as well) and local operators 
and promoters/corporates. It was believed the UTI mutual fund was the backbone of 
purchases in the infotech sector supported by the infamous operator Ketan Parikh. The 
tech meltdown of 2001 resulted in sharp redemption for the scheme in early 2002.
In mid 2002, the UTI decided to skip a dividend for its flagship US-64 scheme for the
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2001-2002 year. This was because the NAV of the scheme has eroded sharply and was 
much lower than the face value of Rs. 10. On 1st August 2002, the NAV of US-64 was only 
Rs. 5.80.
The RBI was reported as contemplating a repurchase arrangement with UTI. This behavior 
of the RBI was an attem pt to insulate the guilds market from the UTI crisis which was 
already having an impact on the equity market. Even some commercial banks such as 
the Bank of India, and State Bank of India started extending loans against UTI’s US-64 
scheme at a steep discount. However, many other banks adopted a wait and watch policy.
The finance minister, Y. Sinha was initially reluctant to provide any sort of government 
support to UTI. In a press conference he was quoted as saying, “ We cannot go on spend­
ing government money for bailouts. A budgetary support is not a desirable option at the 
moment.” However this policy could not be sustained. A majority of public sector banks 
rejected the proposal of buying stocks held under its flagship US-64 scheme. However, 
these banks were willing to extend clean loans to UTI for a short period, provided the 
central government gave a “comfort letter” ensuring timely payment of the interest and 
principal amount. However, the finance minister was not keen on providing a “sovereign 
guarantee” to public sector banks in lieu of loans extended to UTI. The chairman of UTI, 
M. Damodaran was quoted as saying that “ There were problems on two fronts - liquid­
ity and solvency. The liquidity can be taken care of by the banks line of credit. But, to 
address the solvency issue, the government will have to step in at the second stage, if the 
market does not pick up by that time- That is, the government will have to bail out UTI.V 
M. Damodaran said that, in the wake of a problem regarding the solvency issue, if the 
government was not forthcoming with funding, UTI would dump its illiquid stocks in the 
market.
A report by global consultancy firm Mckinsey declared that UTI may need $500 million
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to stay solvent. Mckinsey argued that, given the high fiscal deficit, recapitalization from 
government funds would not be easy. Also, funds raised from the capital market would 
not be sufficient. After a series of meetings between UTI chairman, M. Damodaran and 
Secretary of the Department of Economic Affairs and later with Finance Minister Y. Sinha, 
the government decided to provide cash assistance to UTI of Rs. 5 billion. Officials said the 
liabilities to the center would be provided for either in the budget or the final supplementary 
demand for grants and will be in the nature of a contingent liability on the government. 
Financial analysts began suggesting the government would have to bail out the country’s 
largest mutual fund operator for another year. In the light of a negative reserve of about 
Rs. 37 billion and payment obligation for about Rs. 9 billion for two of its MIP schemes 
maturing 2002 UTI had demanded around Rs. 50 billion. The Cabinet Committee on 
Economic Affairs chaired by the Prime minister, Mr. A. B. Vajpayee, approved a bailout 
package of over Rs.145 billion for UTI to meet the liabilities on its flagship US-64 and 
assured return schemes.
The government also considered some tax concessions for US-64 unit holders so as to create 
a market, reduce redemption and keep up investment in the scheme. The Finance Minister 
also asserted there would be no budgetary impact as a result of the package, although it 
would add to the fiscal burden and contribute to public debt. The UTI case provides an 
interesting and important example of policy reversal in the face of financial crisis.
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B .l  Values of Endogenous Variables
Labor market equilibrium implies:
It = 1 -  x t
W age ra te : wt
Substituting equations (3.6) and (3.12) into Eq. (3.28) gives
__________________ A&t_________________
Wt [l +  7 eJ{ «  +  9)^  +  %[5 +  (1 -  qs)ipr]}]
C red it: Lt
Substituting equations (B.2) and (B.l) in Eq. (3.25) gives:
j ,   ________________ r^e t__________________ 7
[l +  7e, {(7r,* + 8)4> + ff[i5 + (1 -  9 ?)^r]}] A
(B.l)
(B.2)
(B.3)
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Consum ption: q
Substituting equations (3.12) and (3.2) in Eq. (3.21) gives:
1
Cl “  A[1 + rj{(W( +  -  ff[(l -  <??)(! -  </’)'-]}]
(B.4)
D em and D eposits: dt
Substituting Eq. (B.4) in Eq. (3.19) gives:
d = ________________________________________
‘ a[i  +  77{(7r(* +  e)i) -  f f [(1 -  ??)(! -  V')'-]}]
(B.5)
Leisure xt
Substituting Eq. (B.2) in Eq. (3.22) gives:
[l + 7eJ{(7T+ 0)^ + + (1 -  qCj^r]}]
Aet
High Powered m oney ht
Substituting equations (B.5) and (B.3) in Eq. (3.4) gives:
ht — ij) ___________________Vet___________________
A 1 + v{{ t̂ + W  ” SK1 “ 90(! -  <Wr]}]
7 Aet
[l +  qe7! «  + 6)ip + ffr[6+( 1 -  qv)ipr]}]
+
1
A
(B.6)
(B.7)
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Foreign Borrowings: dj
- 1) r\et +_ A [1  +  77{(7T^ +  0)%!) -  f f  [ ( 1  -  9 < 0 ( 1  ~  V > )^ ]} ]
_________________ ________________________
[1 + 7eJ{K* + W  + ff + (1 -  A
7
(B.8)
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B.2 Baxter King Filter
Baxter and King (1995) suggest six requirements for a detrending method:
• The filter should extract a cyclical component within a specified range of periodicities, 
and leave the characteristics of this component undistorted;
• there should be no phase shift, i.e. the filter should not change the timing of the 
turning points in the series under analysis;
• The filter should be an optimal approximation to the “ideal” filter;
• the filter should have trend-reducing properties;
• the filter should yield business cycle components unrelated to the length of the ob­
servation period; and
• the method must be operational.
They proposed a new digital filter, the derivation of which is explicitly based on these 
requirements. The theory behind the filter is now discussed.
B .2 .1  Theory
The Baxter-King (BK) filter is an approximation to an ideal band-pass filter. The ideal 
filter has the following two-sided infinite moving average representation:
oo
a(L) = akljk
k=—oo
where symmetry (a* =  a_fc) is imposed so that the filter does not include a phase shift. 
The extent to which periodic components of the filtered series are related to periodic
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components of the unfiltered series is determined by the transfer function. The BK filter is 
designed to pass through a stationary component of output whose periodicity ranges from 
18 to 96 months per cycle. The transfer function for a stationary series of this ideal filter 
is defined as:
a ( c j )
1 if 7r/48 <  |cj| <  7r/9;
<
0 otherwise.
where the frequency band is derived for the monthly series using u = 2tt/P. For practical 
purposes Baxter and King (1995) use the truncated version of the ideal filter, which is the 
optimal approximation:
K
a(L) = ] T  akLk
k = —K
The approximate band-pass filter, with the corresponding transfer function 0 ^ ( 0 ;) trun­
cates the sample by 2K data points. In our case K = 8 is used and hence the sample is 
trimmed by 8 months each from the each end of the sample and thus the analysis is done 
with 107 observations ranging from May 1991 to March 2000. The BK filter renders the 
trending series as stationary. This is done by assigning weights to the symmetric moving 
average such that the weights sum to zero (J2k=-Kah =  0)- Thus, if the weights sum to 
zero the filter can be factored out as:
ak(L) =  - (1  -  L)(l -  L - 'W k-^L )  
= L - \ 1 - L * ) V K-
K
h= —( K —l)
where
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and the coefficients of ^ k -\(L) are given by
% l = XO' “  I
j=\h\+l
The BK filter contains two differencing operators and hence it removes linear and quadratic 
time trends and up to two unit roots.
_________________________ Appendix C ..
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER FOUR
C,1 Theoretical Justification of M ultiple Structural 
Breaks and U nit-R oot H ypothesis
The following section draws upon from (Lumsdaine and Papell, 1997), (Banerjee et al., 
1992), (Sims et al., 1990)
The transformed regressors
Yt =  [yt\  1, (Rt -  d0t), t +  1, D / l t+i ,D /2 t+i, D Slt+u DS2t +  1]' are taking
Ytl = (ARt -  d0,  , A Rt- k+1 -  d0)
d0 =  E (A R t)
In order to write the Eq. (4.18) in the transformed form as suggested by Sims, a parameter 
vector £ is defined and Eq. (4.18) rewritten as 
Rt — £'Yt-1 +  £t
The errors are assumed to satisfy the following assumption
et is a martingale difference sequence and satisfies = o2, E(\€t\%\€t-it,„ = Pi{i =
3,4), and suptE(\et \4+l,\et- i r.. =  p < oo for some v > 0
The above assumption gives T -1//2 = >  aW(X).  It is to be noted that “= ^ ” i.e. weak
150
APPENDIX C. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER FOUR 151
convergence is uniform if A E [0,1] and in this case W  is the standard one dimensional 
Brownian motion. We also have following properties :
T - ^ E j ^ Y ^ e t  ==> crB(l), T ^ E ^ Y ^ R t  ==» 0 where Dk is a non random positive 
semidefinite matrix, and B(  1) is a k dimensional Brownian Motion with covariance ma­
trix life, independent of W . Take as the startup fraction and define S\ and 62 as the 
fractions of the sample at which the first and second (endogenous) structural breaks oc­
cur i.e. 5i = S B 1/ T  and 62 = SB2/T .  The test statistics are computed over a two- 
dimensional grid of possible distinct combinations of ki and k2 where k0 = [T6q] and 
ki = k0, k0 +  1 ,......, T  — k0. It is evident now that the OLS test statistics of the esti­
mated coefficients are a function of and 62 or in other words their value depends on 
the dates of structural breaks. The sequential OLS estimator of the coefficient vector
worth noting that the asymptotic distribution of the t-statistic under the unit-root hy­
pothesis i.e. /i =  0 is given by :
where W* is the continuous time residual from a projection of a Brownian motion onto the 
functions [1, s, l( s  > tfx), l ( s  > <52), (s -  <h)l(s > Si), (s -  S2) l ( s  > S2\.
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C.2 Cointegration with Unknown Structural Breaks
This appendix heavily draws upon from Jha and Sharma (2004). The present appendix 
proposes a methodology of incorporating endogenous structural breaks if the series are 
indeed integrated of order one after allowing for breaks at the unit root stage. There 
is an important literature ((Chow, 1960), (Quandt, 1960), (Chu, 1989)) emphasizing the 
need to allow for changes in the values of estimated parameters, over time, in time series 
regressions. However, these studies do not consider models with non-stationary regressors. 
(Hansen, 1992) permits this possibility by suggesting a test of parameter instability for 
/( l )  processes. Hansen suggests tests for parameter instability as an alternative test for 
cointegration between two 1(1) variables. In the context here this amounts to estimating 
the following model:
Rt — At Et +  Ct (C.l)
where Rt is revenue, Et expenditure and At is a vector of parameters.1 The presence of pa­
rameter stability results in the uniform convergence of the estimated regression coefficients 
to the cointegrating relationship in the whole space of the sample. Hansen (1992) describes 
three test statistics for testing parameter instability in the context of fully modified esti­
mation of cointegrated regression models. These are: Sup F  test, M ean F  test and the 
Lc test.2 For all the three tests the null hypothesis is the same - A t is constant but these 
tests differ on alternative hypothesis. Hansen (1992) points out that no cointegration is a 
special case of the alternative hypothesis for which the Lc statistics is an LM  test statistics 
and hence they conclude Lc is a test of null of cointegration against the alternative of no 
cointegration.
1There is no presumption that Eq. (C.l) indicates the pattern of causality between the two variables.
2 All the three tests assume unknown timing of the structural break.
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If the above tests reveal lack of cointegration then Gregory and Hansen (1996) suggest 
residual-based tests for cointegration allowing for regime shifts. These tests are comple­
mentary to the above test and can be used to distinguish between lack of cointegration 
and a regime shift. These tests reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration if there is 
cointegration with regime shifts. These residual-based tests incorporate regime shifts in 
trend as well as slope of the standard cointegration model similar to the procedure adopted 
in the case of unit root models. The model specifications are:
Standard Cointegration:
Rt =  m 4- aT E t +  et , t =  1 , . . . ,  n
Level shift (C):
Rt — Mi +  p 2 P̂tT +  a T Et + et , t — 1 , . . . ,  n
Level shift w ith  tren d (C /T ):
Rt — Ah T M2(Mtr + ßt + o T Et + &t, t — 1 , . . .  ,71
R egim e shift (C /S ):
(C.2)
(C.3)
(C.4)
Rt — T  l +  M2 Ptr +  0:  ̂ Et +  a j  Ettptr -be*, t =  1 , . . . ,  n (C.5)
Gregory and Hansen (1996) suggests three tests to detect cointegration in the possible 
presence of regime shifts. The first two are modified Phillips (1987) test statistics (Zt(r), 
Za(r)) and the third is date dependent ADF statistic (ADF*). These statistics are com­
puted for each possible structural change and then the smallest value (largest negative 
value)3 is taken across all break points. Thus the following test statistics are used for the
3 The smaller the test statistic the more evidence against the null hypothesis
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analysis:
Z*a =  jnf Z a ( r )
t € T
(C.6)
Z ;  =  inf Z t ( r )
t € T
(C.7)
A D F *  =  inf A D F I t )
t er
(C.8)
The significant value of test statistics implies rejection of null of no cointegration against 
the alternative of cointegration with regime shift.
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